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Japan’s corporate sector has, at different times in recent history, been organized according to 
every major model.  Prior to World War II, wealth Japanese families locked in their control 
over large corporations by organizing them into pyramidal groups, called zaibatsu, similar to 
structures currently found in Canada, France, Korea, Italy, and Sweden. In the 1930s, the 
military government imposed a centrally planned command economy, with private property 
rights retained as little more than a legal fiction.  The American occupation force replaced 
this with a widely held corporate sector similar to that of the United Kingdom and United 
States.  A bout of takeovers and greenmail ensued.  To defend their positions, Japanese top 
executives placed small numerous blocks of stock with each others’ firms, creating dense 
networks of small intercorporate blocks that summed to majority blocks in each firm.  These 
networks, called  keiretsu, halted hostile takeovers completely.  Although their primary 
functions were to lock in corporate control rights, both zaibatsu and keiretsu were probably 
also rational responses to a variety of institutional failings.  Successful zaibatsu and keiretsu 
were enthusiastic political rent-seekers, raising the possibility that large corporate groups are 
better at influencing government than free standing firms. In the case of keiretsu especially, 
this rent seeking probably retarded financial development and created long-term economic 
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1.   Introduction 
The history of Japanese corporate ownership is especially interesting because it has 
changed more radically and more often than in any other major industrial economy.  
These changes, and the successes and failures associated with them, cast light upon 
fundamental issues in corporate governance and the economics of institutions.   
  Historical and contemporary research into corporate ownership in Japan both 
focus on intercorporate networks.  In the last third of the twentieth century, the inter-
firm networks of interest were horizontal and vertical keiretsu groups of corporations.  
Horizontal keiretsu are inter-industry networks of firms whose small individual equity 
stakes in each other collectively sum to control blocks.  An example is the Mitsui 
group of companies.  Vertical  keiretsu are similar structures that encompass the 
suppliers and customers of a single large firm, such as Toyota Motors.  In both 
variants, public shareholders only have access to minority interests, which renders the 
stock market essentially irrelevant to corporate governance role.  Adjunct to the 
keiretsu networks, most Japanese firms have strong ties to their lead lenders, or main 
banks.   
  However, keiretsu are a relatively recent development in Japanese economic 
history.  During the feudal Takagawa period (1603  -1868), Japanese firms were 
owned entirely by families - or, perhaps more properly, by clans.  The Mitsui and 
Sumitomo family businesses both emerged during this era.  In both cases, extensive 
sets of family rules and traditions determined corporate governance issues. 
  Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the new government promoted rapid 
industrialization.  The Mitsuis, Sumitomos, and other new family businesses like 
Mitsubishi (run by the Iwasakis) needed capital vastly in excess of their own wealth, 
and turned to public equity markets.  The families organized a new corporation to  
  2 
 
raise equity financing for each new venture, and organized them into family 
controlled pyramidal groups.  At the apex of each was a family partnership (later a 
family corporation), which also served as a holding company to control several public 
corporations.  These, in turn, each controlled other public corporations, which in turn 
controlled yet other public companies.  These inter-firm networks, called zaibatsu, 
were essentially identical to modern Korean chaebol and similar pyramidal business 
groups elsewhere.
1  Despite much research, there seems to be little consensus in the 
literature regarding the contributions of zaibatsu to the rapid development of the 
prewar period.  For example, the powerful zaibatsu families may have been more 
concerned about preserving their wealth and control, and may have been too 
conservative to undertake high-risk projects in new industries that might have 
accelerated Japan's modernization.  Also, the ability of zaibatsu with different 
structures to survive the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s points to the importance 
of a bank with a widely diversified loan portfolio.   
  During World War II, Japan de facto nationalized all its major corporations, 
subordinating them to central planners in a rigid system paralleling in many ways that 
prevailing in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.
2  The Temporary Funds Adjustments Law 
of 1937 created the Kikakuin, or Planning Agency, to centralize economic planning 
and administration.  This required boards to obtain government approval before most 
important corporate decisions, such as changing their articles of  incorporation and 
issuing equity or debt.  Further government decrees abolished boards’ rights to set 
                                                 
1 The Chinese characters for zaibatsu are pronounced chaebol in Korean.  One distinction between pre-
World War II Japanese zaibatsu and contemporary Korean chaebol is a stricter adherence to blood 
kinship in the governance of the latter.  Authority based on blood kinship is an important element of 
Confucianism, which is influential in both Chinese and Korean culture.  Japanese Buddhist beliefs 
allowed more leeway for inept blood kin to be sidelined.  
2 Central planning in Japan involved rigid central plans, state command and control over all aspects of 
the economy, and the de facto abolition of ownership rights for capital.  However, de jure private 
ownership of land was retained, as in communist Poland, as was de jure private ownership of zaibatsu 
and many other private-sector corporations.    
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dividends in 1939 and to appoint managers in 1943, reassigning these powers to 
Kikakuin.  The Kikakuin consciously imitated many of the planning methods the 
Soviet Union used for its heavy industrialization in the 1930s.
3  This was 
accomplished amid much condemnation of shareholders (meaning the  zaibatsu 
families) for their self-interest, risk aversion, and unpatriotic concern with short term 
profit.  This r hetoric would resurface later as a justification for depriving small 
shareholders, rather than controlling shareholders, of governance input.  The great 
zaibatsu families, of course, protested these charges.    
  Following the war, Japan was governed by the United States military from 
1945 to 1952.  General MacArthur, taking the wartime condemnations of the zaibatsu 
families at face value, confiscated their stock in their holding companies, unwound all 
the intercorporate stakes among zaibatsu firms, and sold these shares into the equity 
market.  Consequently, Japan (briefly) was a widely held economy, similar to the 
United States and United Kingdom, in which most large public companies had no 
controlling shareholder.  A market for corporate control quickly took off, as Japanese 
firms undertook hostile takeovers of each other, and raiders extracted greenmail from 
unwilling target firms.      
  Japanese managers and bankers disliked the job insecurity of the Anglo-
American system of corporate governance.  Following the end of the US Occupation 
in 1952, Japanese firms began purchasing white squire positions in each other to head 
off raiders.  The major banks were soon organizing intercorporate equity placements, 
and the current keiretsu system emerged during the 1950s and developed more fully 
in the 1960s.  That system, which has characterized Japanese big business up to the 
                                                 
3 See Okazaki (1994) for details.    
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present is now under increasing stress.  At the beginning of the current century, Japan 
is once again bracing for major institutional changes. 
  Throughout all of these changes, the principals of Japan’s great businesses 
actively pursued their own interests, mainly profit and control, with varying degrees 
of success.  In general, they shaped organizational forms to accommodate these 
objectives, and reconfigured their organizational forms as new legal and other 
constraints were imposed upon them.  This paper examines the emergence and 
evolution of these different organizational structures as responses changing political 
and institutional circumstances. 
Of course, institutional changes sometimes also reflected the lobbying activity 
of big business.  Consequently, we also discuss the extent to which institutional 
environments changed in response to business.  However, critical points in Japan’s 
business history seem to involve clearly exogenous events that clearly required 
adaptation by the business sector.  The abrupt opening of Japan to world trade and the 
decision of the Meiji government to embark on a crash program of modernization was 
one such occasion.   The generally negative attitudes of both the Japanese military 
government and the Allied Occupation Force in the mid 20
th century were two others.    
  There are doubtless many reasons for the rise of the  zaibatsu and the 
spontaneous organization of the keiretsu.   Certainly, economies of scope and scale, 
reputation, circumventing flawed markets and institutions, and numerous other factors 
are in play.  However, this paper argues that the primary purpose of both the zaibatsu 
and the keiretsu was to protect the control rights, first of the great zaibatsu families, 
and later of the professional managers running  keiretsu firms.  While the group 
structures of both zaibatsu and keiretsu accomplished this objective to a large extent, 
the zaibatsu families and keiretsu managers, especially main bank managers, also  
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appear to have possessed an advantage in interacting with the political system.  This 
allowed both the zaibatsu families and the keiretsu managers to become entrenched, 
and to hold on to corporate governance powers they might better have relinquished. 
  This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the initial state of 
ownership of Japan’s largest businesses immediately prior to the country’s 
industrialization.  Section 3 describes the formation and development of Japan’s great 
zaibatsu in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Section 4 details the culling of 
Japan’s corporate sector that took place in the 1920s and 1930s, as the country 
endured a spate of depressions.  Section 5 describes the imposition of a centrally 
planned economy by the military in the late 1930s and 1940s.  Section 6 describes the 
US Occupation and the reconstruction of Japan as a widely held economy with 
Anglo-American corporate governance.  Section 7 describes the modification of this 
system into the present keiretsu ownership structures.  Section 8 reflects on the 
economics underlying the zaibatsu and keiretsu, and attempts to distill lessons from 
Japan’s corporate history.  Section 9 concludes.   
 
2.  Initial Conditions:  The Tokugawa Economy 
Japan’s first contact with the Western World was in 1542, when a Portuguese trading 
expedition arrived.  At the time, Japan was divided into warring principalities.  By 
1590, General Hideyoshi Toyotomi had united the country by force.  To pacify it, he 
demanded absolute submission from every part of society.  Foreign merchants and 
missionaries interfered with this submission, so Hideyoshi persecuted and expelled 
foreigners.
4    
                                                 
4 Japanese shogun and warlords are often cited by their first names.  
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  Hideyoshi died in 1598 after a failed invasion of Korea, and his comrade, 
General Ieyasu Tokugawa, quickly took charge.  By 1603, Ieyasu had defeated rival 
warlords, many backed by foreigners, and was appointed Shogun by the Emperor in 
Kyoto.  He established a government in Edo (renamed Tokyo in 1868 when the 
Emperor moved there from Kyoto), and his line would govern Japan as Shoguns for 
the over 250 years. Tokugawa cemented an already rigid hereditary cast system, with 
samurai warriors at the top, peasants in a second tier, craftsmen below them, and 
merchants in the bottom stratum of society. 
5 Unsurprisingly, this moral inversion 
resulted in a prolonged economic stagnation, exacerbated by a code of chivalry, called 
bushido, that glorified honor above all else, entrusted all samurai with the power of 
life and death over the lower casts, forbade the higher casts from transacting business, 
and disparaged the pursuit of wealth as dishonorable.  This era, called the Tokugawa 
Period or Edo Period, is characterized by a profound reverence for bushido and a 
deep suspicion of Western ideas.   
  Ieyasu promoted foreign trade and suppressed Christianity, but the third 
Tokugawa shogun, his grandson Iemitsu, concluded that trade and ideas were 
inseparable.  Consequently, in 1633 he forbade traveling abroad, banned all foreign 
books, and proclaimed a death sentence of foreigners found outside a small enclave of 
the port of Nagasaki. Although they permitted some foreign books after 1720, this 
early anti-globalization backlash by the Tokugawa shoguns continued to hermetically 
isolate Japan.   
  Although foreign trade had been prohibited, domestic trade flourished and 
many merchant families grew wealthy.  The Mitsui dynasty was founded by 
Hachirobei Takatoshi  Mitsui (1622-1694), a silk merchant who expanded into other 
                                                 
5 Only eta, outcasts with unclean professions were lower.  
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commodities because of his extensive use of barter transactions.  The Sumitomo 
family appeared to have started in Kyoto and then moved to Osaka in the early Edo 
period.  It grew wealthy by operating a copper mining and smelting business.  Both 
families established complicated House Rules - constitutions governing all aspects of 
the families’ businesses.  Power was divided between a Patriarch and a Family 
Council, which served a quasi-parliamentary function.   
  For example, the Mitsui family consisted of eleven founding clans, and 
devised elaborate rules for maintaining a balance of power among those clans.  
Representatives from these clans participated in management.  The Mitsui House 
Rules prohibited the founding clans from withdrawing their ownership shares and 
prohibited other branches of the family from gaining ownership rights.  Voting power 
in the Mitsui Family Council passed to the eldest sons of each founding clan, who 
acted for his clan.  Younger sons who wanted to participate in the business could do 
so as managers and could be given cash for start-up money.  Although the Mitsui 
family was known for adopting competent hired managers, this was done through 
marriage to a Mitsui daughter.
6  Additional House Rules governed the disposition of 
property, marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance; and were strictly enforced at 
Family Councils to avoid intra-family feuds.  House Rules forbade any Mitsui from 
bringing any family dispute to the legal courts, becoming involved in politics publicly, 
creating debts, and guaranteeing debts.   Involvement or investment in any non-family 
                                                 
6 Adoptions, like marriages, had to be approved by the Mitsui Family Council.  An important example 
of this is Rizaemon Minomura (1821-1877).  Born to an unemployed samurai in Nagano, he migrated 
to Edo. While working for a merchant, he negotiated with Mitsui.  Mitsui hired him in 1866 and 
ultimately adopted him into the family as head of the Minomura clan, one of the eleven at Mitsui 
Family Council.  (He adopted the Minomura name.)  He subsequently held various key positions with 
Mitsui companies.  In 1876 he reorganized the family money exchange operation into the Mitsui Bank 
and became its president.  Rizaemon Minomura later adopted a merchant’s son, Risuke Minomura 
(1843-1901).      
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business, and serving in public office were proscribed unless the Mitsui Council made 
an exception.
7   
  Each clan’s assets were divided into three groups: business assets, common 
assets, and clan assets.  Common assets were used to dealing with expenditures for 
disasters and emergencies, and so served as a sort of insurance fund.  Each clan could 
manage its common assets as it chose, and the principal value of these assets passed 
from generation to generation.  However, accumulated returns did not.  When a clan 
patriarch dies, the Mitsui Family Council met to decide how to distribute these gains 
among the eleven clans.   This was done to preserve the original rankings of the 
eleven founding clans.  Business assets were common property of the entire Mitsui 
family, and the House Rules permitted no division of them among the clans.  Clan 
assets were the undisputed property of the individual clans, and could not be 
redistributed by the Family Council under normal circumstances.   
The Sumitomo zaibatsu began when the daughter of Masatomo Sumitomo 
(1585-1652), a wealthy druggist and publisher in Kyoto, married Tomomochi Soga, 
eldest son of Riemon Soga (1572-1636), who – in turn - was married to the older 
sister of Masatomo Sumitomo.  Riemon Soga struggled to reproduce a new copper 
smelting method he had learned of from a Western merchant in Osaka, and ultimately 
succeeded.  This method uses lead to extract silver and other impurities from copper 
ore and  increases the efficiency of copper smelting drastically.  This technique 
remained in use in Japan for three centuries - until the end of the 19
th century.  Soga 
founded a copper refinery in Kyoto in 1590.  Tomomochi adopted the Sumitomo 
surname and opened a business in Osaka, where he and his father lisenced the new 
copper smelting method to their competitors.  This concentrated virtually all of 
                                                 
7 See Yasuoka (1984) for details.   
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Japan’s copper smelting in Osaka and earned Tomomochi great respect.  Tomomochi 
marketed his copper products using the trade name “Sumitomo Izumiya.”  Japan 
rapidly became one of the largest producers of copper in the world in the Edo period.  
In 1691 the Sumitomo family began a mining copper at Besshi for the Shogunate.
8  
This mining operation proved extraordinarily lucrative, and financed virtually all 
subsequent Sumitomo businesses - including textiles, clothing, sugar and medicines.  
Subsequently one of the Sumitomo clans also began a money exchange firm.          
The Sumitomo Family Code was similar to the Mitsui Code in many ways.  
However, a few differences are worth noting.  For instance, the Sumitomo Code 
provided for its own revision, declaring a consensus of the Council needed to change 
the Code.
9  Perhaps more importantly, the Sumitomo Code had no provision 
governing inheritance or requiring continued family dominance.  Nonetheless, family 
control was preserved.  This was probably partly due to two other differences:  First, 
the Sumitomo patriarch led a symbolic existence.  He gave formal approval to matters 
set before him, but the Council actually made all significant decisions.  This 
prevented one clan from dominating, and creating a situation where other clans might 
want out.  Second, all family disputes, even ones within a single Sumitomo clan, had 
to be referred to the Council.  This kept the council aware of discontent within clans 
at its early stages. It also created a much more centralized management structure than 
in the Mitsui group. Very detailed reporting of anything extraordinary to the upper 
ranks was required.
10    
Tokugawa rule was slowly weakened by famines, riots, and especially by a 
growing financial dependence of  samurai on merchants.  For example, both the 
                                                 
8 The Besshi copper mine remained in operation until 1973, and produced 700,000 tons of copper 
during its lifetime.   
9 See Yasuoka (1984) for details. 
10 See Asajima (1984).    
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Mitsui and Sumitomo families served the Tokugawa government extensively in all 
manner of commercial and financial dimensions. Such “corruption” undermined the 
code of bushido, which had legitimized Tokugawa rule.   Incompetence and declining 
morality among the Tokugawa leadership also undermined Edo’s power.  From the 
late 18
th century on, the Russians and various other European nations tried to force 
Japan’s market open.  In 1853 and 1854, the American Commodore Perry bombarded 
Edo until the Tokugawa government agreed to open a limited number of ports to 
foreign trade.  
However, foreign trade remained very limited until the Meiji Restoration in 
1868. Contemptuous of the Tokugawa’s increasingly craven attitude towards 
foreigners, a group of  samurai captured the Emperor and seized power, claiming 
legitimacy by restoring his rightful rule.  In  fact, the Imperial family, which had 
continued to provide titular Emperors in Kyoto throughout the Edo Period, had been 
symbolic throughout Japanese history, and real power remained with these samurai 
now as well.   Nonetheless, this era is called the Meiji Period, in honor of the emperor 
who reigned from 1868 to 1912.     
 
3.    Early Industrialization Following the Meiji Restoration 
The new Meiji government quickly realized that, to gain freedom from foreign 
pressure, Japan needed Western technology and therefore Western ideas.  They 
dispatched a cadre of Japan’s brightest students to study abroad and return with 
descriptions of foreign institutions.  The government then launched a two-decade 
program of modernization, copying what they perceived to be best practice abroad.  
This period in Japan’s history closely resembles some of the “shock therapy” reforms 
currently on-going in post-socialist states. In rapid fire, the new government  
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introduced democracy modeled on the German Diet, compulsory education modeled 
on the French and German school systems, universities and an army modeled after 
those of Prussia, and a navy modeled after the British fleet.  Religious freedom, social 
mobility, and land reform quickly undermined both bushido and the cast system. 
But  most importantly, the Meiji government introduced the institutions of 
capitalism.  During its crash program of modernization, Japan adopted a legal system 
largely based on German civil law.  Public bond trading began in the 1870s, and in 
1878 the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges were formed and subjected to regulation 
under the Stock Exchange Ordinance.   Leading merchant families began issuing 
stock to finance industrialization and the great pyramidal zaibatsu groups that came to 
dominate Japan formed.  
A central problem Meiji governments confronted was the distaste of the great 
mercantile families for pooling their capital with that of outsiders.  On the one hand, 
the government wanted to encourage Japan’s existing large businesses to grow, and 
this required respecting the sensibilities of their principals.  On the other hand, the 
Meiji leaders knew that economic growth would require strangers pooling their 
capital to catch up with the West.  Apparently with government prodding, the Mitsui, 
the Ono and several other families formed the First National Bank.  Yet the Mitsui 
and Ono could not get along.  Dissatisfied, the Mitsui set up their own Mitsui Bank in 
1876.  Similarly, after the Yasuda and Kawasaki set up the Third National Bank, the 
Yasuda decided to set up their own Yasuda Bank in 1880.        
This tension created apparent inconsistency in the legal codes the Meiji 
governments adopted.  For example, one section of the 1896 civil code stipulates that 
“joint owners of property can demand for their due shares of the property at any 
time.”  Yet the same code guaranteed the special rights of the head of a family to  
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control family property, including that of sub-families, for the purpose of supporting 
them in the future.  
  In the following Sections we will briefly describe the evolution of zaibatsu 
from the Meiji restoration (1868) to WWII and to the post WWII period, and how this 
tension played out.  In the early stages of the development of zaibatsu around the 
Meiji restoration period the behavior of Mitsui and Sumitomo, for example, are of 
particular interest since they were both established merchant enterprises before the 
Meiji restoration.  During the period of rapid modernization of Japan in the Meiji 
period newly created Mitsubishi zaibatsu, among others, was successful in expanding 
its control of companies in many industries.   
 
Defining a Zaibatsu 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to define zaibatsu., a term replete with the 
ambiguity Japanese so admire.  Many academics and others, both inside and outside 
Japan, use the term to refer to all the large business groups in the country prior to 
World War II.   These zaibatsu are often contrasted with their postwar counterparts, 
the keiretsu of contemporary Japan.  However, beyond that there seems to be no clear-
cut unified definition of what a  zaibatsu actually is.   In the literature, many 
definitions and characteristics of zaibatsu have been put forward as fundamental by 
Japanese and other researchers.  
  First, there is a general view in the Japanese business and economic history 
literature that the zaibatsu developed in the Taisho period (1912 to1926) after World 
War I.
11  This seems to be because of the notion in Japan that zaibatsu is basically a 
                                                 
11 Historians assign periods corresponding to the reigns of emperors.  The Meiji period is from 1868 to 
1912, the Taisho period is from 1912 to 1926, and the Showa period is from 1926 to 1989.  Note that 
emperors choose official names upon their ascension.  Thus in 1926, Hirohito chose the official name 
Showa, meaning enlightened peace.      
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political term that came into use as concepts like income distribution and monopoly 
capital (and Marxism) gained attention in the Taisho period.   However, both the 
Mitsui and Sumitomo groups, which are always listed among the zaibatsu, and which 
played a decisive role in the Meiji era modernization of Japan, had formed long ago 
under the Tokugawa shoguns.  Other major groups, including the Mitsubishi and 
Yasuda zaibatsu, were already important during the Meiji period (1868 to 1912).  Yet 
other zaibatsu clearly did form after World War I.   
  Second, even though zaibatsu typically implies family-control, the often-cited 
list of the ten main zaibatsu (Table 1) includes Nissan.  As we show below, no family 
ever controlled Nissan during its entire existence.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  Third, zaibatsu were often considered to have substantial monopoly power in 
many, not just a few, industries.  Indeed, the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers 
(SCAP) used industry market shares to ascertain whether or not a group was a 
zaibatsu and thus to be broken up.  Fourth, zaibatsu are often thought to have been 
relatively independent of bank financing.  Fifth, zaibatsu were business groups with 
vast land holdings under which lay great mineral wealth.  Sixth, a zaibatsu was 
sometimes defined as a group of firms connected with a general trading firm, or sogo-
shosha (SS), that was important to their operations.  Seventh, the term zaibatsu is now 
sometimes extended to cover family controlled groups of public companies in 
developing economies in general.   
  Finally, zaibatsu had pyramidal structures.  A family holding company or 
partnership controlled a set of directly-owned subsidiaries, which then controlled  
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other firms, which then controlled yet other firms, and so on.  The family usually had 
an operating decision rule for determining which firms to own directly versus 
indirectly.  Figure 1 illustrates the stylized structure of a pyramidal corporate group. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As we show below, the vague definition of zaibatsu in the minds of the Japanese and 
foreign architects of the postwar system may be, at least in part, responsible for the 
less-than-complete dissolution of the zaibatsu after the war.   
  In this paper we use the term zaibatsu to denote any large pyramidal group of 
publicly traded firms. This distances the term from both origin and control, from 
contentious issues like monopoly power or land rents, and from difficult to measure 
concepts like the importance of bank financing or of general trading firms.  It also 
distinguishes the pyramidal  zaibatsu from the  keiretsu groups of postwar Japan, 
whose structure of intercorporate ownership is not pyramidal.  
  We will use the term apex firm to denote the family controlled entity at the top 
of the pyramid. The firms in which it holds equity stakes, we refer to as directly 
controlled subsidiaries.  The firms that are controlled by the apex firm, but whose 
stock the apex firm does not hold, we call indirectly controlled subsidiaries.  Note 
that indirectly controlled subsidiaries can be controlled either by directly controlled 
subsidiaries or other indirectly controlled subsidiaries.  These terms are illustrated in 
Figure 1.   
 
Zaibatsu Formation  
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The development of  zaibatsu (and other firms) was relatively unhindered by 
government intervention until the 1930s.  Few regulations existed in financial 
markets, yet capital markets provided 87% of the new capital required by Japanese 
corporations in 1931.  Thus Japan had a robust shareholder culture in the early 
twentieth century despite the absence of well defined shareholder rights.  Corporate 
governance was generally in the hands of controlling shareholders – usually wealthy 
families.   Banks had little or no corporate governance role.  Public shareholders were 
essentially at the mercy of insiders.   
  The first significant expansions by the main  zaibatsu families beyond their 
traditional businesses occurred in connection with the Meiji government’s mass 
privatization program of 1880.  The government had used state funds to establish 
industries it deemed essential to modernization.  But in doing so, it had accumulated a 
huge public debt.  To deal with this fiscal problem, the government implemented a 
mass sell-off of state-owned enterprises in all areas except munitions.  Included were 
factories producing virtually all important manufactured goods  - including steel, 
cement, coal, metals, machines, ships, textiles, etc.   
Thus, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and a few other zaibatsu acquired these 
privatized operations, and thus entered new lines of business.  Many historians 
consider this the ‘beginning’ of Japan’s zaibatsu.  Although there was no clear cut 
method of allocating state-owned factories, each of the three main zaibatsu ended up 
with some assets in each key industries: mining, shipbuilding, machinery, textile, and 
so on.   
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Zaibatsu Expansion and Family Control 
One of the most important corporate governance considerations for business families 
during this period was preserving full control over their essential business operations 
while satisfying an ever-growing need for capital.  For families that tried to keep their 
operations closely held, this ever-increasing need for more capital became a serious 
problem.    
  Such problems were not entirely new.  As families grew in size with each 
generation, preserving meaningful control for the  head of the family had always 
presented a difficult problem.  For example, the Mitsui family had applied an 
operating rule to distribute ownership within the family in a certain way since the 
Tokugawa Period.  Table 2 shows the ownership shares of the different branches of 
the Mitsui family in the family business over the more than 200 years since its 
foundation in 1694.  The stakes are remarkably stable through time.       
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Nonetheless, the Mitsui patriarch dictated most family businesses decisions.  
This divided ownership with an imposed centralized control that largely negated the 
rights of individual owners grew increasingly difficult to maintain.  The problem grew 
even worse when the Meiji government instituted new laws regarding a bsolute 
individual ownership rights.  This rule could be relaxed in family firms, so that the 
head of the household might exercise ownership rights over family properties, 
including inheritance rights.  However, this exemption could not be carried beyond 
blood kin to relationships between an employer and share owning employees.    
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  This situation presented problems, for important shareholders who were not 
blood kin had become common.  It made sense to reward competent hired managers 
with a limited ownership stake in the business.  And sometimes competent hired 
managers, rewarded in other ways, grew wealthy enough that letting them buy stock 
seemed necessary to retain them. 
  When the Meiji government began establishing the German Civil Code, large 
family businesses were usually recognized as general partnerships.  As more outsiders 
were brought in to supply capital, and as each new generation created more family, 
such businesses found the legal status accorded a limited partnership more workable. 
In 1893, Japan enacted a Commercial Code, prompting many  zaibatsu holding 
company partnerships to incorporate.  But restructuring an entire family business into 
a publicly traded joint stock company was resisted.  As new laws on ownership 
became effective, hired managers who had become investors obtained, theoretically at 
least, a status equal to family members.  This was difficult for the great families to 
accept, and the concept of random members of society buying and selling such a 
status was intolerable.   
  Even equity stakes held by competent hired managers and their heirs often 
proved unbearable, and wealthy business families often went to considerable lengths 
to repair such perceived errors.  For example, the Mitsui Bank, which was founded in 
1876, soon had more than four hundred manager- shareholders. When the Mitsu 
family reorganized it as a general partnership in 1893, it bought up all of these shares.  
When the Kamoike zaibatsu family established the Thirteenth National Bank, forty 
distant relatives were shareholders.  In 1897 the main branch of the family bought out  
  18 
 
all of these distant relatives and re-established the bank as the Kamoike Bank, 
privately owned by the Kamoike patriarch.
12   
  This sort of response is perhaps understandable, for successful family 
businesses operated with a common objective imposed by a core of family values, 
traditions, and history.  Outsiders, even very competent ones, could not share fully in 
this, and their input would surely appear to the family as interference.  Nevertheless, 
family firms closed to outsiders risked alienating their best managers, or being shut 
out of the top end of the managerial labor market.  Family businesses lacking 
management skill among blood kin, and unable to hire, it risked degeneration.   
  Some zaibatsu, most notably the Mitsui and Sumitomo, were particularly 
successful in growing rapidly without outside equity financing.  Their success has 
been attributed to a series of highly competent hired managers, but their connections 
with important political leaders were certainly at least as important as their raw 
competence.   
The Sumitomo family possessed a lucrative cash cow in the Besshi copper 
mines they had obtained from the Shogunate, and so could afford to keep more distant 
from the Meiji government – at least initially.  Mitsui, however, needed to earn the 
Meiji government’s gratitude.  They accomplished this by providing financial 
assistance to the cash-starved Meiji restoration forces and the struggling new 
government in its critical first years.  In return, Mitsui was appointed Government 
Treasury Agent, a duty that provided the family a range of highly valuable 
opportunities.   
To fulfill its treasury duties, Mitsui established a national network of branch 
offices.  These generated substantial cash flows from treasury business, and also 
                                                 
12 The Kamoike Bank subsequently became the Sanwa Bank, which evolved into the current UFJ Bank.  
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served as bases for other trading.  Business developed so rapidly that the House of 
Mitsui had to set up the Kokusangata Karihonten, or Temporary Head Office for 
Domestic Trade, in Tokyo in 1874.  Learning of the Meiji g overnment’s aim of 
promoting foreign trade, Mitsui began selling silk yarn and tea to western merchants 
on a commission basis, and acting as a forwarding agent of imported goods between 
Tokyo and Yokohama.
13   Mitsui’s trading business, handled by employees steeped in 
Tokugawa traditions, lost money.  In 1876, Mitsui was about to close its trading 
ventures when Kaoru Inoue (1835-1915), a leading Meiji politician, suddenly decided 
to return to the government and offered to sell his Senshusha company to Mitsui to 
raise political funds.
14  Mitsui jumped at this opportunity, for Senshusha came not 
only with government contracts, but with its top manager, Takashi Masuda, who 
trained at the largest American merchant house in Japan.    Mitsui established Mitsui 
Bussan (Mitsui & Co.) in July 1876 by merging Senshusha and the Temporary Head 
Office for Domestic Trade, and appointed Masuda manager.   
Mitsui Bussan’s first government business was a sales monopoly on high-
quality coal from the state-owned Miike mine.  Exporting Miike coal on commission 
to China through Shanghai immediately became highly profitable, and Mitsui Busan 
established its first foreign office in Shanghai by the end of 1876.  This allowed Mitsu 
Bussan to acquire skill as an international trader. Since Mitsui Bussan traded coal, 
like all other items, entirely on commission its capital requirement were minimal.   
The only financing the House of Mitsui provided was a ¥50,000 overdraft allowance 
from the Mitsui Bank.  In 1877, Mitsui Bussan made ¥200,000 – an enormous fortune 
                                                 
13 See Yamamura (1976).   
14 Inoue subsequently served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Finance, and also as a 
Privy Councilor.  Senshusha, established in 1872 by Inoue and others was a moderately successful 
trading business, mostly due to Inoue’s political influence.  Its primary business was executing 
government procurement orders for imported goods for Inoue’s powerful political associates.  
Senshusha imported wool, guns, and fertilizer; and exported rice, tea and silk.    
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at the time - supplying sixty percent of the military procurements for the Seinan War, 
a large operation to put down rebellion in Kyushu in 1877.  
The Sumitomo and Mitsui were not the only great Takagawa merchant houses.  
However, they were the only ones that expanded their capital bases as the economy 
grew, and were clearly the most adept at positioning themselves to assist the 
government in implementing its economic policies.  Other great business families of 
the Tokugawa era, such as the Kamoike zaibatsu, were less nimble and grew too 
slowly, and thus were gradually eclipsed as Japan grew.   
  Expanding the capital base by bringing in outsiders held a different danger.  
For the new investors could seize control, reducing the family to the status of limited 
partners.  For example, both the Shimomura and Ohmura zaibatsu brought in outside 
investors who took control.  Even worse from the perspective of the old families, the 
new controlling shareholders shifted the business out of the (money losing) traditional 
Japanese clothing business and into department store-based retailing.   
  And despite their freedom from outside shareholders, the Mitsui still faced 
legal problem when different branches of the family began exerting their legal rights 
under the new business law the government was erecting.   The eleven distinct 
branches of Mitsui had submitted to the dictatorial rule of the patriarch in the past.  
But that submission smarted as new laws delineated rights and as legal rights came to 
be associated with partnership stakes.  
 
Pyramids as a Solution 
Corporate pyramids are an elegant solution to all of these problems, for they can 
preserve total control in the hands of insiders while permitting access to limitless 
public capital.   To see this, consider a wealthy Japanese family with a fortune of ¥1  
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billion, invested in the assets of a family business, Choten Corp.  The family sees a 
multitude of profitable business opportunities, and estimates that it could easily and 
profitably invest many billions of yen.  To see how the family can undertake all of 
these investments by constructing a pyramidal group, and retain control not only of 
the family business, but of all these new ventures too, return to Figure 1.   
   First, the family expands Choten Corp by issuing new public shares worth 
almost ¥1 billion.  This is organized so that outside shareholders end up owning fifty 
percent less one share of the new Choten, which is now worth almost ¥2 billion.  This 
gives the family almost ¥1 billion in cash, yet preserves its complete control of the 
family business.  The latter is because its fifty-percent-plus-one-share stake is 
sufficient to completely control who is elected to the board of directors.  Choten is 
now set to become the apex firm of the pyramidal group.   
  Next, the family organizes two new firms, Hitotsu-Ichi Corp. and Hitotsu-Ni 
Corp.
15  Each of these firms is financed with a ¥500 million equity investment from 
Choten and a public offering to raise almost ¥500 million by selling outside 
shareholders fifty percent less one share. Hitotsu-Ichi Corp. and Hitotsu-Ni Corp. now 
each have ¥1 billion. The family now fully controls three firms, with unconsolidated 
balance sheets totaling ¥4 billion and ¥3 billion in consolidated assets.  The family’s 
control is complete because it fully controls Toshitotta, and Toshitotta’s board votes a 
fifty-percent-plus-one-share stake in both Hitotsu-Ichi Corp. and Hitotsu-Ni Corp., 
and thus completely control their boards.   
  To expand further, the family has Hitotsu-Ichi Corp. and Hitotsu-Ni Corp. 
each organize two new firms.  Hitotsu-Ichi organizes Futatsu-Ichi and Futatsu-Ni, 
financing each with a ¥500 million equity investment and a public offering to raise 
                                                 
15 In one Japanese counting system, hitotsu is one, futatsu is two, mittsu is three, and yottsu is four.  In 
another system, ichi is one, ni is two, san is three, and yon is four. The appropriate use of the two 
systems is a matter of grammar. Choten means “apex”.    
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almost ¥500 million by selling outside shareholders fifty percent less one share.  
Hitotsu-Ni Corp. organizes Futatsu-San and Futatsu-Yon similarly.  The family now 
fully controls seven firms, with unconsolidated values totaling ¥8 billion and ¥5 
billion in consolidated assets.   
  In the next step, Futatsu-Ichi organizes two new companies, Mittsu-Ichi and 
Mittsu-Ni, as do Futatsu-Ni, Futatsu-San, and Futatsu-Yon.  Each of these eight new 
firms is financed with a ¥500 million equity investment from the Hitotsu level firm 
organizing it and a public offering that raises almost ¥500 million by selling fifty 
percent less one share to outside shareholders. The family now fully controls fifteen 
firms, with unconsolidated balance sheets totaling ¥16 billion and ¥9 billion in 
consolidated assets.   
  Each Mittsu level firm can then similarly organize two Yottsu level firms, 
resulting in a pyramid of thirty-one firms worth ¥32 billion on paper and holding ¥17 
billion in consolidated assets.  This process can be repeated until the family runs out 
of attractive investment opportunities.   
When constructed this way, a pyramid with  n layers contains 2
n – 1 firms, 
which have unconsolidated book values totaling 2
n billion yen and consolidated assets 




n n  yen.   
  Thus, by setting up a five-layer pyramid, the family can raise ¥14 billion in 
public equity while retaining complete control.  Had the family instead simply issued 
¥14 billion in additional Choten shares, their stake would have been diluted to one 
fifteenth or 6.67 percent and they would have lost control.   
  The elegance and simplicity of this solution surely appealed to the great 
mercantile families of Japan, for they enthusiastically embraced this model of 
intercorporate ownership and built the vast prewar zaibatsu in this way.  Both public  
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investors and querulous relatives could be tapped for capital  and excluded from 
corporate governance.   
Of course, variations from this formula were possible.  For instance, the 
controlling families often wished to keep the apex firm of the pyramid closely held.  
They thus raised the initial money necessary to establish the first tier of subsidiaries 
from retained earnings.  Since the Mitsui and Sumitomo families had both run highly 
profitable businesses for generations, their accumulated wealth was easily great 
enough to skip the first step in the above recipe.  In contrast, other later groups, such 
as Nissan, had public shareholders in their apex firms.  Also, the use of non-voting or 
super-voting shares allows much more leverage of the family’s initial wealth.  Firms 
at different levels can have real assets and engage in real businesses, as well as 
serving as holding companies for the stock of firms in lower tiers.   Actual pyramids 
were also much messier than Figure 1, in that different levels of firms sometimes 
cooperated to control firms in all levels, including higher tiers of the pyramid.  
Nonetheless, Figure 1 captures the essential logic of a pyramidal group as a method of 
retaining full control in the hands of a single principal while raising the majority of 
the group’s capital from outside investors.  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the actual structures of the Mitsui and Sumitomo 
groups at their greatest extent.   
 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 
The Big Four Zaibatsu 
While the Mitsui and Sumitomo zaibatsu may be said to have formed in the late 19
th 
century in the sense that the pyramidal groups formed at that time, both enterprises  
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have their true origins in the Tokugawa period.  However, other  zaibatsu were 
genuinely new. The two largest of these were the Mitsubishi and Yasuda zaibatsu.  
These four groups were the largest zaibatsu, so their development merits close 
inspection.   
  The founding of the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges in 1877 allowed 
Japanese companies to tap capital from individual investors. Mitsui and Sumitomo 
both began expanding by constructing pyramids.   However, their investments outside 
their primary lines of business were relatively small, experimental and limited.   
Thus, the Mitsui family, having begun as silk merchants, expanded into areas 
related to clothing manufacture and sale.  The family established trading operations in 
certain other commodities to allow efficient barter transactions for silk and a currency 
exchange operation to deal with foreign companies. However, the Mitsui did invest 
significant amounts of capital in other ventures from time to time.  During the first 20 
years of the Meiji era, the Japanese  government publicly funded drives to build 
strategically important industries, which were then transferred to private owners. 
Mitsui often cooperated in these drives at the request of the Japanese government, and 
became favored partners in many such ventures.   
Towards the end of the 19
th century, the government’s financial problems 
caused it to embark on a mass privatization program, where it sold off all these 
ventures save its armament factories, postal and telegraph systems, mints and 
railroads.  The magnitude of this mass divestiture was unprecedented.  Between 1874 
and 1896 alone, twenty six major government projects - including coal, copper, silver 
and gold mines, cotton and silk spinning mills, shipyards, cement factory, iron works, 
sugar refinery and glass factory  - were transferred to private owners – usually the 
large zaibatsu.   
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However, with the exceptions of these privatized enterprise, the great zaibatsu 
remained commerce-based.   Only at the end of the 19
th century did they embark on 
their own diversification efforts, and this was often at the prodding of hired managers, 
not family members. Extensive diversification would wait until after the First World 
War.  A few years may have been necessary before people knowledgeable about the 
possibilities opened by concepts like limited liability and joint stock companies rose 
to positions of influence.
16  
The mass privatization alluded to above is a key event in the history of the 
great zaibatsu.   Economic historians’ assessment of this privatization program is 
mixed.  Many  zaibatsu groups, particularly Mitsui and Mitsubishi, benefited 
enormously, for their former public enterprises turned out to be their main sources of 
subsequent growth.  
Certainly, the great zaibatsu families were virtually the only entities in Japan 
able to participate extensively in the privatization. The limited number of bidders and 
financial exigency on the government may have generated bargain prices.  Some of 
these sales were negotiated while others used public auctions. But most of the 
privatization prices were far lower than the Meiji government’s capital outlays in 
establishing these enterprises.
17 For example, Takashima Coal Mine (government 
outlay by 1885, ¥393,848) was sold for ¥550,000 yen in 1874 to Shoraisha, owned by 
Shojiro Goto, who in turn sold it to Mitsubishi’s Iwasaki family in 1881.  Other 
examples include the Shinmachi Silk Spinning Mill (set-up cost ¥138,984), sold to 
Mitsui in 1887 for ¥141,000; the Nagasaki Shipyard (¥1,130,949 yen), sold to 
Mitsubishi for ¥459,000; Tomioka Filature (¥310,000) was sold to Mitsui in 1893 for 
¥121,460; the Sado Gold Mine (¥1,419,244) and the Ikuno Silver Mine (¥1,760,866), 
                                                 
16 Morikawa (1992), p. 27. 
17 For details, see Kobayashi (1985), pp.64-65.    
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sold together to Mitsubishi in 1896 for ¥2,560,926; and Kamaishi Iron Works 
(¥2,376,625), sold to Chobei Tanaka, an iron merchant and supplier for the Japanese 
army and navy, in 1887 for ¥12,600. Tanaka subsequently sold Kamaishi Iron Works 
to his company, Kamaishi Mining, in 1924, and then divested it to Nippon Steel.
18   
The rarity of exceptions, such as the sale of the Miike Coal Mine (setup cost 
¥757,060), sold to Mitsui in 1888 for ¥4,590,439, only accentuates the low 
privatization prices. 
However, many state-owned enterprises were in dismal shape, and although 
many privatized enterprises encountered serious difficulties, the Japanese government 
rarely provided direct subsidies.  For example, a major earthquake in 1889 destroyed 
the Kattate shaft of Mitsui’s Miike coal mine.  Finance Minister Matsukata refused 
pleas by Mitsui, supported by cabinet members, for subsidies and rescheduling of its 
payments.  Mitsui completed the total payment for the mine by 1902, as per the 
original purchase agreement.  Of course the government did provide generous tariff 
protection and other indirect assistance to insure the success of the privatized 
enterprises.   
Regardless of the government’s conscious intentions at the time of the 
privatizations, they turned out to be plums.  At the time, mining was highly profitable 
in Japan because of the expense involved in importing.  Privatized mining companies, 
acquired by the Mitsui and Mitsuibishi at this time, served as core cash cows until the 
mid 1950s, when major veins were exhausted.  Most  zaibatsu electric equipment 
manufacturers also apparently developed by supplying equipment to their affiliated 
mining companies.   
                                                 
18 Tanaka and the Kamaishi Mining had a spectacular success in the iron industry, achieving a 72% 
market share in pig iron by 1900.  
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The positions of different firms within the zaibatsu pyramids were a matter of 
great concern.  Mitsui’s primary lines of business at the end of the Edo period were 
still Japanese clothing and money exchange when the family diversified into banking.  
When their Japanese clothing business became shaky around 1873, the family 
restructured the  pyramid moving that business to a lower tier and delegating its 
management to distant relatives of the eleven core clans.   In contrast, the Mitsui Bank 
quickly became profitable after its inception in 1876, and served as the apex firm of 
the Mitsui zaibatsu until 1893.   
This example illustrates how the family also moved poor performers deeper 
into the pyramid from time to time.  Again, in 1909, the Mitsui Council restructured 
the pyramid with a new holding company at the apex, which then controlled the 
Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Mining and the trading firm Mitsui Bussan.  This restructuring 
was accompanied by a major rearrangement of firms throughout the pyramid, with 
good performers moving closer to the apex and weak firms moving closer deeper into 
the pyramid.    Thus, in the Mitsui  zaibatsu, poorly performing firms were 
concentrated deep in the pyramid, while good performers tended to be in the top level. 
Morikawa (1980, pp. 46-57) and others argue that greater direct ownership by 
the Mitsui family should be taken as indicative of a greater family “concern” for a 
firm.  This interpretation is strained by for the positioning of what were undoubtedly 
key companies in deep levels of the Mitsui pyramid.  For example, the Mitsui 
partnership held only 5.8% and 5.4%, respectively, of the outstanding shares of Oji 
Paper and Kanebo as of 1930.  Perhaps more importantly, Shibura Engineering Works, 
the predecessor of Toshiba, was not included in contemporary lists of core Mitsui 
firms – despite the Mitsui partnership having held stakes ranging from fifty to eighty 
five percent in Shibaura most of the time from the late 1800s until 1939, when  
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Shibaura merged with Tokyo Electric to form Tokyo Shibaura (Toshiba) Electric.  
That this firm, which was clearly of significant national importance, received less 
attention than many more obscure firms seems untenable.  Morikawa (1980) proposes 
that some Mitsui top managers and partners, though they recognized the importance 
of Shibaura’s operations and products, could not understand it, noting that the Mitsui 
partnership apparently came close to divesting Shibaura in 1902.  However, but strong 
oppositions from Mitsui Mining and others forstalled this, and Shibaura went public 
as a Mitsui group company in 1904.   
It seems more likely that  firms’ positions in the zaibatsu pyramids were 
designed to facilitate tunneling, as described by Morck et al. (2000).   Self-dealing to 
concentrate profits in firms owned directly by the Mitsui and losses in firms merely 
controlled by them readily explains the better apparent performance of firms higher in 
the pyramids.  Certainly, Shibaura’s performance in the early 1900s lagged that of 
other major Mitsui firms.  Moreover, Mitsui completed negotiations with General 
Electric for partnerships and technical licensing in 1904 that left G.E. holding about 
25-30 % of Shibaura until 1931.       
Records attest that the Mitsui head office regarded the questions of which 
companies should be placed where in the group pyramid and what stakes each 
company should hold in other group firms as fundamental. As the structure of the 
Mitsui zaibatsu grew ever more complex from 1912 to 1930, the lower tier of the 
pyramid were sometimes drastically restructured, but the apex changed little.  The 
Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Bussan, Mitsui Mining and Toshin Warehousing remained direct  
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subsidiaries of the Mitsui partnership.  The only significant change was the addition 
of the Mitsui Life Insurance and Mitsui Trust Bank as direct subsidiaries after 1912.
19   
   Table 3 shows that the amounts of other companies’ shares held by these 
three Mitsui firms were already significant by the early 1900s, though Mitsui 
Bussan’s holding was relatively minor compared to the other two Mitsui family firms  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Mitsui’s most intensive diversification efforts began with Mitsui Mining’s 
entry into chemical industries in the early 1910s.   Mitsui Bussan founded a 
shipbuilding company in 1917, purchased an iron and steel company in 1924, and 
established Toyo Rayon to enter the chemical textile business.  In fact, this wave of 
diversification was undertaken exclusively through new subsidiaries of Mitsui Mining, 
the Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Bussan, or through new subsidiaries of subsidiaries.  
Table 4 shows the extent of this expansion, and Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the 
zaibatsu at this point.    
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
It is again noteworthy that the Mitsui choose to place all their new industrial 
companies deep in their pyramid, and to have only their mining company, bank, and 
trading company directly owned by the family holding company.   
The Sumitomo pyramid, shown in Figure 3, developed a structure quite 
similar to that of the Mitsui pyramid.  In particular, financial institutions are located 
                                                 
19 See Tamaki (1976), pp.84 and 86.  Fruin (1992, pp.100-102) describes how the Mitsubishi zaibatsu 
structure was reorganized several times between 1916 and 1926, and argues that this was in response to 
Mitsubishi’s evolving strategic considerations such as economies of scope and scale.               
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near the apex, and industrial companies tend to be deeper in the pyramid.  Direct 
Sumitomo subsidiaries, like those of Mitsui and Mitsubishi partnerships, included a 
bank,  sogo shosha (general trading firm), trust bank, insurance company, mining 
company and warehousing operation.  Relatively few Sumitomo companies had 
publicly traded shares.   The Sumitomo bank went public in 1917, Sumitomo Trust in  
1925, and Sumitomo Chemical in 1934, Sumitomo Metal Industrials in 1935, and 
Sumitomo Electric Wire and Cable Works in 1937.  All the other companies had no 
shareholders outside of Sumitomo until relatively late.   
The Yasuda  zaibatsu, whose structure Figure 4 shows to also follow this 
pattern, is new compared to Mitsui and Sumitomo. The Yasuda zaibatsu began at the 
end of the Tokogawa era when Zenjiro Yasuda (1838-1922), the son of a poor 
samurai in Toyama, moved to Edo and obtained work in a money changing business.  
In 1863 he began his own business of providing tax-farming services to the Shogunate, 
which mainly involved overseeing the collection and t ransport of silver and gold.  
After the Restoration, he provided the same services to the Meiji government. Yasuda 
profited from the delay between the collection of taxes and their forwarding to the 
government.  His fortune was greatly magnified when he bought up depreciated Meiji 
paper money that the government subsequently decided to exchange for gold coin.     
  Yasuda and Kawasaki established the Third National Bank in 1876, and then 
Yasuda set up its own Yasuda Bank in 1880.  Although the Yasuda Bank’s investors 
consisted of several members of the Yasuda family, it seems likely that Zenjiro 
provided all its initial ¥200,000 capitalization.  Zenjiro needed to use several family 
members to satisfy the Meiji government’s requirement that no single investor could 
establish a bank.    
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In 1887 Zenjiro organized his family company, Hozensha, with its initial 
capital of one million yen designated as the paid-in capital of the Yasuda Bank.  
Zenjiro assigned half of this to Hozansha, and the other half to ten of his relatives: six 
Yasuda families given ¥360,000, two branch clans given ¥80,000 and two other 
relations given ¥60,000.  Hozensha’s ¥500,000 of stocks were designated the common 
property of the six Yasuda families.  The charter Zenjiro established utterly forbade 
the transfer of Yasuda Bank,even within the  family.  No certificates were issued and 
ownership was recorded in a registration book in Hozensha’s safe.  Yasuda Bank 
shareholders also relinquish the right to embark on commercial activities of their own.                 
  After observing the Mitsui organize their general partnership in 1909, Yasuda 
reorganized Hozensha as a general partnership capitalized at ¥10 million in 1912.  
The partnership served as a holding company for Yasuda’s securities, properties and 
business operations.  By this time, the Yasuda zaibatsu already contained seventeen 
banks and participated in sixteen other business operations.  New biological and 
adopted sons boosted the number of Yasuda family investors from ten to thirteen.  In 
1919 Yasuda established its House Constitution, freezing the number of Yasuda 
investors at thirteen.  This structure served the House of Yasuda well, for its 
continued focus on financial services and limited presence in capital-hungry heavy 
industries allowed it to limit public shareholder participation.
20  Table 5 summarizing 
the industrial diversification of the ten major prewar zaibatsu illustrates this focus. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                 
20  A reorganization as a joint stock company was discussed during World War II, but never 
implemented.    
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The Yasuda zaibatsu’s orientation towards banking was accelerated by the 
merger of eleven Yasuda-controlled banks into the Yasuda bank in 1913.  The new 
bank was the largest of all the zaibatsu banks, with a 1913 paid-in capital of ¥150 
million  – compared to ¥600 thousand, ¥500 thousand, ¥430 thousand, and ¥300 
thousand for the Mitsui, Sumitomo,  Daiichi, and  (Mitsubishi banks, respectively.  
The Yasuda bank remained Japan’s largest bank, building on its deposit and loan 
bases that both substantially exceeded half a billion yen, and its reserves of ¥169 
million.  The Yasuda Bank continued expanding via mergers with other banks, and 
rapidly developed strong relationships by with the Azano and Mori zaibatsu.  These 
ties gave the Yasuda Bank an industrially diversified loan portfolio, but the Yasuda 
zaibatsu’s core businesses remained in the financial sector – encompassing banking, 
insurance, and other financial services.  As Table 5 shows, the House of Yasuda 
limited its entry into heavy industries even during World War II. 
  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
  The Mitsubishi  zaibatsu began as Tsukumo Co., which was renamed 
Mitsukawa Company in 1872 because it had three ( mittsu) owners - S. Ishikawa 
(1828-1882), S. Kawada (1836-1896), and K. Nakagawa.
21  In 1873 Mitsukawa Co 
was renamed as Mitsubishi Co., which appears to have been a limited partnership 
between the three original owners and Yataro Iwasaki (1834-1885).   After Yataro’s 
death, his son Hisaya (1865-1955) and Hisaya’s younger brother Yanosuke (1851-
1904) joined the partnership.   The Mitsubishi partnership was dissolved around 1891, 
                                                 
21 Nakagawa’s birth or death dates are unknown.  One variant of the number three in Japanese is mittsu.  
The precise origin of the Mitsubishi group is a somewhat contentious issue among Japanese historians.  
See Mishima (1981).   
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and Hisaya and Yanosuke Iwasaki each invested ¥250 million in 1893 to set up a new 
limited partnership – also called the Mitsubishi Company.   
The Mitsubishi Company’s direct subsidiaries included Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding and Mitsubishi Mining, which both extensively developed Meiji 
government projects the  zaibatsu purchased.  Unlike the Mitsui, Sumitomo, and 
Yasuda charters, the Mitsubishi Charter allowed each of the Iwasaki families to retain 
their personal income and to start up their own businesses.  This flexibility turned out 
to be a considerable advantage for the Iwaskai family.  Individual Iwasaki clans 
enthusiastically captured business opportunities that Mitsubishi itself could undertake.  
One such example was the Meiji government’s Takashima Coal Mine, which 
Horaisha bought when it was privatized.  Because the mine’s operations were 
subsidized by the government, Mitsubishi companies could not own it directly.  
However, the Iwasaki family was allowed to purchase it from Horaisha when that firm 
was under financial distress.
22 The Takashima Coal Mine and other important 
Mitsubishi firms like Asahi Glass, Meiji Life Insurance, and Kirin Beer, were 
officially regarded as separate from the Mitsubishi  zaibatsu.  This was clearly a 
bureaucratic slight of h and, for these companies had extensive financing and other 
relationship with formal members of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and were controlled by 
the Iwasaki family.  These firms also all became Mitsubishi keiretsu companies after 
World War II.   
The Mitsubishi Company, the zaibatsu pyramid’s apex, was reorganized as a 
joint stock company in 1937 and portions of its shares were distributed to Iwasaki 
relatives and to seven unrelated executives.  Apparently, these shareholders were 
forbidden from transferring their holdings without permissions from the company.  In 
                                                 
22 See Yasuoka (1976), p.64) for details.     
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1940 the Mitsubishi Company increased its paid-in capital from ¥120 million to ¥240 
million and the original two Iwasaki families together continued to own 47.5% of the 
outstanding shares of the company.       
Although Mitsubishi, like Mitsui and Sumitomo, remained a family controlled 
structure, the Iwasaki family also used marriage extensively to bring talented men into 
the family  Thus, unusually in a family enterprise, marriageable daughters were 
valued as highly as sons, if not more highly.
23  Another characteristic of Mitsubishi’s 
governance system was that its ownership stakes in its direct subsidiaries, such as the 
Mitsubishi Bank and the Mitsubishi Corporation, was not as extensive as in the Mitsui 
and Sumitomo groups.  Mitsubishi Company’s average ownership share in its direct 
subsidiaries was around 30%, versus 66% for Mitsui.  Similarly Mitsubishi’s average 
ownership share in the direct subsidiaries of Mitsubishi’s direct subsidiaries was only 
18%, while the figure for Mitsui was 49%.  The Mitsubishi zaibatsu was much less 
averse to using public equity financing, and so was able to expand extensively into 
capital-intensive industries like machinery, mining, finance, and shipping.  This gave 
the Mitsubishi companies leading market positions in these rising sectors of the 
economy, yet the Iwasakis retained full control, for their stakes were always sufficient 
to dominate shareholder meetings.
24 
Figure 5 illustrates the structure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu as it later developed. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Industrial Zaibatsu 
                                                 
23 Morikawa (1992), p.53. 
24 For details, see Mishima (1981), pp. 340-341.  
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The Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda zaibatsu are generally ranked as the 
four major family controlled pyramidal groups of prewar Japan.  Three other zaibatsu 
were also important, but their influence extended along specific product chains and 
did not include banks or financial firms.   
These so-called  industrial zaibatsu included the Asano group, built by 
Soichiro Asano (1848-1930) around the Asano Cement Company, the Kawasaki 
group, built around Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co. by Shozo Kawasaki (1837-1911), and 
the Furukawa group, built by Ichibei Furukawa (1832-1903) around his Ashio Copper 
Mines Co.   
 
Widely Held Zaibatsu    
In addition to the four major zaibatsu and the three industrial zaibatsu listed above, 
five other pyramidal groups emerged in the early 1900s - Nissan, Nichitsu, Mori, 
Nisso and Riken.  These structures grew with the stock market, which became much 
more active in the 1900s.  Security prices rose quickly between 1917 and 1919, and 
many individual investors, such as landlords and other property owners, began 
holding substantial amounts of equity in their portfolios.
25   This augmented flow of 
capital into the market allowed, and perhaps arose from, the construction of pyramids 
that were financed with public equity throughout.   
These new  widely held  zaibatsu differed in that the apex company of the 
pyramid was widely held.  Recall that the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo groups, 
initially at least, kept their apex firms as partnerships.  In contrast, the apex firms of 
these new zaibatsu had stock companies often had significant portions of their shares 
owned by outside shareholders who were not blood relatives of their founders.  
                                                 
25 Hashimoto (1997), p.101.  
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In fact, the founders of these groups often held rather small equity stakes in 
the apex firms.  They had little fear of losing control because the founders were often 
highly skilled engineers whose expertise was essential to critical company operations.  
The chemistry experts Shitagu Noguchi, Tomonori Nakano, and Nobuteru Mori built 
the new Nichitsu, Nisso, and Mori  zaibatsu, respectively.  Masatoshi Okochi, an 
expert in machinery manufacture, built the new Riken zaibatsu; while the all around 
genius Yoshisuke Aikawa built Nissan into one of Japan’s major diversified zaibatsu, 
though machinery was more important than other industries, such as metals and 
chemicals to Nissan.   
This technical expertise factor meant that these new  zaibatsu tended to be 
concentrated in heavy industry, and chemical industries, and electric power generation.  
As they grew and diversified, they competed aggressively with established zaibatsu 
companies.  Most of these new zaibatsu, like the industrial zaibatsu, did not control 
financial institutions and relied heavily on outside finance.   
The development of the widely held  zaibatsu can best be illustrated by 
following the history of the largest such group – Nissan.  The Nissan group was 
founded by Yoshisuke Aikawa in a rather roundabout way.   
By 1919, Husanosuke Kuhara (1869-1965) had purchased numerous mines 
and produced 30% of Japan’s domestically mined copper, 40% of its gold, and 50% 
of its silver.  During this rapid expansion, Kuhara had made more than ¥2.4 million 
from an initial public offering of his Kuhara Mining Company.  In the years following 
the First World War, Japan experienced a series of depressions, and Kuhara Mining 
was badly hurt.  When its subsidiary, Kuhara Trading, failed, Kuhara was forced to 
retire on a sick leave.  He delegated the rebuilding of his company to his brother-in-
law, Yoshisuke Aikawa, whose own much smaller firm, Tobata Cast Iron, had  
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survived the depressions.  Aikawa was an engineer who had studied state-of-the-art 
cast iron manufacturing methods in the U.S.  To save Kuhara Mining, he pooled his 
own money and funds from relatives, managers, and outsiders to inject more than ¥25 
million into the company.
26   
Having dealt successfully with Kuhara Mining’s debt crisis, Aikawa joined its 
board in 1926 and quickly replaced Kuhara as president.  To put the firm on a solid 
long-term financial course, Aikawa needed more capital without loss of control.   In 
December 1928 he therefore capitalized a new publicly traded holding company, 
Nippon Sangyo (Nissan).  Simultaneously he also organized Nippon Mining, into 
which he merged Kuhara Mining.  Since Table 6 shows that Kuhara Mining had many 
public shareholders, this merger left Nippon Mining publicly held, but controlled 
through a majority stake by Nissan.  
Aikawa understood that Nissan, or any other new zaibatsu, would need huge 
amounts of capital very quickly to achieve economies of scale comparable to those 
the existing zaibatsu could achieve.  The capital requirement for developing large 
heavy and chemical production establishments rapidly was far beyond his family 
assets, so bringing public shareholders on board was unavoidable.   Yet Aikawa 
wanted to retain control.   
It is clear that Aikawa fully understood the efficacy of pyramidal groups for 
tapping unlimited outside capital while retaining full control. Indeed, Aikawa (1934) 
presents his vision in a diagram, reproduced as Figure 6, of building a pyramid of 
publicly traded subsidiaries, subsidiaries of subsidiaries, and so on, to transform 
public stockholders' capital into his company's capital and give him access to an 
infinite amount of capital.  
                                                 
26 He was widely expected to fail.  Kuhara was compared at the time to Suzuki, described below.  That 
Kuhara ultimately prospered and formed the basis of a new zaibatsu, while Suzuki failed and brought 
down an entire zaibatsu, greatly enhanced Aikawa’s standing.    
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  Aikawa (1934) recognized that, since the apex firm of his pyramid was widely 
held, it was his responsibility to make sure the company always make acceptable 
profits and that its shareholders received a stable payment of dividends.
27   Some 70% 
of Nissan's assets were shares in Nippon Mining, so Nissan was still dangerously 
exposed to that sector, which remained chronically weak until the Japanese 
government began accumulating gold in 1932.  Using this business upturn period, 
Aikawa sold Nippon Mining stock and used the funds raised to diversify Nissan’s 
holdings extensively.    
Aikawa’s main strategy was to purchase promising firms, develop them as 
fully owned subsidiaries, and then take them public through IPOs.  In creating these 
spun-off firms, or bunshin kaisha, Nissan’s role in Japan’s development has much in 
common with that of venture capital firms in the United States, as described in e.g. 
Gompers and Lerner (2002).  Of course there were some differences. While US 
venture capital firms’ objective is to sell their start-ups completely to the public to 
raise funds for the next venture, Nissan always retained a control block, using IPOs to 
extend the pyramid.  This appears to reflect Aikawa’s desire to retain a final say in 
important decisions.   
Nissan's partially spun-off subsidiaries tended to prosper, further enriching 
both Nissan’s shareholders and their own.  Subsidiaries acquired or spun off their own 
subsidiaries, and the pyramidal structure expanded.   Nissan's own paid-in capital 
increased from ¥5.25 million in 1933 to ¥198.37 million in 1937.  During the same 
period, its total assets increased from ¥91.08 million to ¥383.10 million and its 
securities held increased from ¥53.38 million to ¥269.92 million.  Table 6 shows 
Nissan’s share price for the period 1930-1937. 
                                                 
27 Though Aikawa (1934) also justifies “management nationalism” as a legitimate reason for having 
invested in “a few new business lines” which he thought were promising in the future but would 
currently generate no returns in the near term.    
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[Table 6 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
All the while, Nissan itself became ever more widely held.  By May 1937, 
Nissan had 51,804 shareholders, 50,783 of which owned fewer than 500 shares.  The 
fraction of shares Aikawa and his relatives owned continued to fall too.  The total 
stake held by Aikawa and his relatives fell from19.2% in 1929 to only 4.5% in 1937.  
By 1937, only four shareholders - including Aikawa - held more than 10,000 Nissan 
shares.   
  By this time Nissan was at the apex of a pyramid exceeded in scale only by 
those of Mitsui and Mitsubishi, as Table 7 shows.  The Nissan group included Nippon 
Mining, Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Power, Nissan Motor and many other l arge 
manufacturers and utilities.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Local Zaibatsu 
There were many locally important business families in Japan at this time, whose 
operations were limited to  specific geographical areas (e.g. prefecture) and usually 
also  specific lines of business.  These families accumulated wealth in closely held 
family firms, and then used this wealth to expand into new businesses, sometimes 
bringing in other local investors.  Mostly, these pyramidal structures remained small, 
but a few acquired national scope - though they kept their head offices in the original 
localities.  In general, these local zaibatsu did not develop into highly industrialized  
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operations.  It is possible that their limited access to capital explains this.  Indeed, 
their dominance in certain regions may explain why industrialization favored some 
regions over others.   
The role of local zaibatsu in regional development remains poorly understood.  
Important local zaibatsu include the Nakano group, based in Niigata, the Itaya group 
of Hokkaido, the Ito group based in Nagoya, another Ito group in Hyogo, the 
Yasukawa group of Fukuoka, the Kaishima group of Fukuoka, and the Katakura of 
Nagano. Figure 7 describes some of these groups. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
The Zaibatsu and Independent Companies 
Because space constraints, we cannot detail the numerous independent entrepreneurs 
who began to shape the economy in this era.  Among the most important was Sakichi 
Toyoda, who patented the Toyoda wooden hand loom in 1891, and an innovative 
automatic loom in 1924.  Platt Brothers & Co. of England, a world leader in the loom 
industry, paid the 1929 equivalent of one million yen for the rights, and Toyoda later 
these funds to found Toyota Motors as a spin off from his loom making company, 
Toyota Jido Shokki. Another important entrepreneur, Kounosuke Matsushita, founded 
Matsushita Electric Industries in Osaka in 1918 and developed it into one of the 
world's largest manufacturers of electric and electronic products.   
  Although such businesses would become important, they were not the 
dominant players in the prewar Japanese corporate sector.  Zaibatsu firms accounted 
for about thirty-five percent of corporate assets in 1946, with the remained of the 
sector composed of free-standing firms.  Despite  their number and collective  
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economic importance, independent firms were unquestionably less politically 
influential during this period.   
 
4.     Ownership Changes during the Depressions 
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Japan endured a series of depressions, culminating in 
the Great Depression.  The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 so disrupted the economy 
that the Roaring Twenties were essentially muted in Japan.  Several major zaibatsu 
collapsed.  Studying which zaibatsu failed and which survived is highly instructive 
  Key factors explaining survival appear to be the existence of a bank in the 
zaibatsu, its position in the pyramid, and its role in the business dealings of the group.   
The Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo zaibatsu all had banks very near the apexes of 
their pyramids.  Consequently, their health was a primary concern of the controlling 
families.  Moreover, any tunneling that occurred would tend to increase the assets and 
income of these banks.  
  The Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo banks also had well-diversified loan 
portfolios, with only ten to twenty percent of their outstanding loans extended to other 
member firms in their own zaibatsu.  Moreover, these banks had invested their free 
cash flows in equity holdings spanning many firms and industries.  Indeed, the 
reticence of the Mitsubishi Bank to make loans to related companies during the 
depressions forced many Mitsubishi companies, though not the mining and 
shipbuilding concerns, to issue public shares to obtain capital.  The average stake of 
the Mitsubishi apex partnership in its first tier subsidiaries fell from 83.5% in 1921 to 
69.0% in 1928.   
  Other Japanese zaibatsu families used their banks primarily to raise money for 
their zaibatsu firms.  These so-called organ banks were thus poorly diversified.  For  
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example, 94% of the Nakazawa Bank's loans were to insiders, as were 75% of the 
Watanabe Bank's loans.  Likewise, 75% of the loans held by the Matsukata zaibatsu's 
Jugo Bank were to Matsukata firms. .Prior to their collapses in 1927, 72% of the loans 
of the Suzuki's captive bank, the Taiwan Bank, were to Suzuki companies.   
 
The Rise and Fall of the Suzuki Zaibatsu  
Many mercantile families from the Tokugawa era participated actively in Japan’s 
foreign trade after the Meiji restoration.
28  Even though their family businesses began 
as specialists in a particular line of products such as silk, copper, clothing, or sugar, 
they eventually required a general trading firm, or sogo shosha, to transact barter 
business domestically and to handle foreign currency transactions with foreigners.   A 
sogo shosha was a general entity that could deal with all types of profit opportunities 
in both domestic and foreign markets.  The first and largest of these general trading 
companies was Mitsui Bussan.
29   It served as the model for many others.   
  One such imitator was Suzuki Shoten, the Suzuki Merchant Company.  The 
Suzukis began as sugar traders, and organized a sogo shosha to handle miscellaneous 
transactions related to that business.  Suzuki Shoten quickly grew to become the 
second largest sogo shosha.  Suzuki’s rapid expansion took place in two stages.   
  The first was during Japan’s intensive drive to develop its new colony in 
Taiwan, acquired during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895.  Taiwan’s climate 
was ideal for sugar cultivation, and the Suzuki were the logical point men to handle 
Japanese investment in that industry. To transport sugar from Taiwan to Japan, Suzuki 
needed ships, so it also established a presence in shipping and ship building.  During 
this stage of its development, the apex firm of the  zaiabtsu remained a single 
                                                 
28 The largest of these was Mitsui Bussan.  Others include Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Masuda, Abe, Mogi, 
Takada, Iwai, Ataka and Yuasa.   
29 Present Mitsui and Company carries the same company name.  
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proprietorship run by the family patriarch, who soon became one of Japan’s richest 
merchants.   
  The second stage occurred in the period immediately after World War I.  
During a sustained boom from 1914 to 1919, Japan’s GNP grew fivefold, and the 
Suzuki zaibatsu expanded aggressively, creating a large number of firms in many 
industries.  In 1903, the apex firm became a general partnership capitalized at 
¥500,000.  By 1920, this had increased one hundredfold to ¥50 million yen.  Already 
in 1915, the Suzuki’s annual business in foreign trade reached ¥1.54 billion, 
exceeding that of Mitsui Bussan. By the end of the boom, the Suzuki group looked 
comparable in many ways to the Mitsui and Mitsubishi zaibatsu.   
  One of Suzuki’s critical successes occurred in November 1914, three months 
after the beginning of the First World War I.  Although Japan was mired in a deep 
recession at the time, Naokichi Kaneko, the manager of Suzuki Shoten, and  Seiichi 
Takahata, the company’s London branch manager, concluded that Germany’s U-boats 
would cause ship and commodity prices to rise sharply.  Kaneko ordered Takahata to 
buy everything available, including raw materials aboard any transport ship.  Suzuki’s 
purchases of ships, iron, steel, sugar, wheat and other commodities and materials 
wrought an immediate profit of over ¥100 million yen.  This move, more than 
anything else, make Suzuki a global player in trade. 
  Takahata was skilful in handling Suzuki dealing with Great Britain and the 
other allied countries.  He became directly involved in the procurement processes of 
these countries for raw materials, iron and steel products, food supply, ships, and the 
like.  During a period when 50,000 tons of ships were sunk on an average day, Britain 
suffered a severe shortage of transport ships and was directly in the business of 
buying ships.  At one point, the British government advanced Suzuki an  
  44 
 
unprecedented £500,000 deposit towards the purchase of ships.  Suzuki was flooded 
with buy orders for food items from the British and allied governments.  Takahata 
responded, for example, by selling them entire cargos of beans, grain and other food 
items from Hokkaido together with the ships themselves.   
  These developments caused Suzuki to enter a long-term relationship with the 
Taiwan Bank.  Suzuki’s foreign trade transactions were now so enormous that Japan’s 
only government-authorized foreign exchange bank, Yokohama Shokin Bank,
30 was 
incapable of handling them all, forcing Suzuki to rely on more expensive merchant 
bankers.
31   The Japanese government had granted the Taiwan Bank special privileges 
to deal with foreign exchange as well, and Takahata seized upon this as the solution to 
Suzuki’s foreign exchange bottlenecks.  The Taiwan Bank welcomed Suzuki’s 
overtures because its extensive nonperforming loans in China had discouraged other 
zaibatsu companies from doing business with it.   
  A brief but severe recession followed the November 1918 armistice, and 
several small zaibatsu, including Mogi, Kuhara, Masuda, and Abe, failed.  Suzuki 
survived, and when another boom began in September 1919, Takahata concluded that 
another vast expansion was warranted.  The pace of this global expansion was 
unprecedented.  Suzuki gleaned huge profits involving everything from Java sugar to 
wheat and soybeans from Siberia, Manchuria and Qingdao.  In one transaction, 
Suzuki shipped 360,000 tons of wheat from Manchuria to Great Britain using 10,000 
boxcars of the Manchurian Railway and forty-five 8,000 to 10,000 ton freighters.  In 
1919 and 1920, Takahata sold fifty shiploads of Java sugar and earned 65M guilders 
on the 1920 transactions alone.   
                                                 
30 Yokohama Shokin Bank became the Bank of Tokyo after WWII, which more recently merged with 
the Mitsubishi Bank to form the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. 
31 The only other Japanese trading firm which had enough foreign business to warrant using merchant 
bankers was Mitsui Bussan.    
  45 
 
  In 1923, Kaneko restructured the Suzuki pyramid.  The trade division of 
Suzuki Shoten became a public joint stock company, the Suzuki Stock Company, or 
Kabushiki Suzuki, capitalized at ¥80 million and with a paid-in capital of ¥50 million. 
Suzuki Shoten’s remaining operations were reorganized into a holding company, 
Suzuki General Partnership or Suzuki Gomei, capitalized at ¥50 million.  Suzuki 
General Partnership became the new apex firm, controlling seventy-eight listed stock 
companies. Of these, ten were in food industries, twenty four in chemicals, four in 
textiles, two in tobacco, five in mining, five in iron and steel, three in electric 
machinery, three in electric power, three in railways, two in shipping, two in fishing, 
two in real estate and warehousing, three in development, two in the banking and trust 
business, four in insurance, three in commerce, and one in miscellaneous business.   
  The sixty-five of these that were recognized as integral parts of the Suzuki 
zaibatsu had a capitalization of ¥560 million.  The apex firm employed 3,000 people 
and the pyramid firms had 25,000 employees in total.  Figure 8 illustrates the structure 
of the Suzuki pyramid at its greatest extent. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
  Kaneko apparently created some of these manufacturing companies out of a 
sense of nationalism.  He shared with many Japanese managers of the era a belief that 
import substitution would free Japan of its ignominious dependence on foreigners. 
  The 1923 restructuring caused the Suzuki  zaibatsu to take on a structure 
superficially resembling those of the other large zaibatsu.  A holding company stood 
at the apex, major Suzuki powerhouse companies filled the first tier of subsidiaries,  
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their spin-offs filled the second tier, and various acquired companies filled out the 
lower tiers.  Many of these companies continued on with their original names. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
  However, there were two key differences.  Both of these differences seem to 
have played a role in Suzuki’s demise.   
  First, while Suzuki Shoten’s trading division was separated from the apex 
holding company, there was no corresponding separation in personnel.  In fact, Figure 
9 shows that numerous employees held cross-appointments in Suzuki companies. And 
though the Suzuki family held control rights, a hired manager, Kaneko, was actually 
making all the management decisions. Suzuki’s rapid expansion of its business 
activities was not accompanied by an appropriate expansion of its management 
personnel.    
  Second, the Suzuki companies had been financed differently. Suzuki 
companies used debt financing much more extensively than other zaibatsu firms, both 
to finance expansion and to finance day-to-day business dealings.  That debt generally 
took the form of loans from the Taiwan Bank, the Suzuki group’s de facto group bank. 
This seems to have reflected Kaneko’s desire to maintain undisputed control 
throughout the pyramid.  Equity financing risked empowering outside shareholders, 
and might even be bought up by other zaibatsu, jeopardizing Kaneko’s absolute 
control. Debt from sources other than the Taiwan Bank risked interference from 
outside creditors.  This aversion led to a rapid build-up of Suzuki companies’ debts to 
the Taiwan Bank, shown in Table 8, and a similarly rapidly increasing exposure of the 
Taiwan bank to the Suzuki companies’ fortunes.    
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  Soon, the bulk of the Taiwan Bank’s loan portfolio was tied up in other Suzuki 
companies. However, the integration of the Taiwan Bank into the Suzuki group was 
via a “long-term relationship.”  Kaneko only controlled the Taiwan Bank because of 
its financial dependence on business with Suzuki companies.  And Suzuki’s financial 
position was weakened in the early 1920s because of a costly failed effort to merge 
two large flour companies, Nisshin and Nihon Flour Companies.  Finally, most of 
Suzuki General Partnership’s capital was tied up in Kabushiki Suzuki, the trading 
company.  
  The collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu was spectacular.
32   
  The September 1919 boom that Kaneko gambled on turned out to be short 
lived.  The Japanese economy went into a depression in 1920, and again in 1922.  
These were followed by the Great Kanto Earthquake depression of 1924, and the 
Showa finance depression of 1927.  The latter two events in particular kept Japan’s 
economy from realizing the growth that seemed likely in 1919 and exposed the 
weakness of the Suzuki zaibatsu and other similar pyramids.     
  The Great Kanto earthquake of September 1
st, 1923 was one of the worst in 
world history.  It destroyed Tokyo, Yokohama and much of the surrounding area, 
killing 140,000 people either directly, in the ensuing fires, or in mob violence against 
Koreans in the quake’s aftermath. Business offices and records were destroyed, and 
much of Japan’s most economically important modern infrastructure was ruined.   
  But another effect of the earthquake was purely financial  – the Showa 
depression.  The earthquake seriously damaged numerous businesses, many of which 
had issued bills prior to the quake that they were now unable to pay. This, in turn, 
created cash flow problems for the banks holding those bills. The government 
                                                 
32 The collapse of Suzuki zaibatsu compares in scale with the collapses of Ivar Kreuger’s STAB in 
Sweden in 1932 and that of the Stinnes concerns in Germany in the 1920s.  
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therefore developed a program under which the Bank of Japan would re-discount bills 
listing the disaster area as place of payment or listing a merchant with offices in the 
disaster area as the debtor.  These earthquake bills, or tegata, were to provide a two-
year grace period for collection, and this was subsequently twice extended, adding 
two more years to the grace period. The government promised compensation to the 
Bank of Japan for any losses sustained because of the program. At the end of 1926, 
there was a total of more than ¥200 million in unsettled earthquake bills, of which 
¥160 million had been re-discounted by the Bank of Japan.
33   
  Suzuki companies had made more extensive use of debt financing than had 
Mitsui, Sumitomo, or Mitsubishi companies.  The Suzuki group’ total debt at the end 
of 1926 was ¥500 million, of which ¥379 was owed to the Taiwan Bank.  Kaneko had 
accumulated this amount of debt through adept financial maneuvers involving mixing 
and counterbalancing credit created by the Taiwan Bank, Suzuki firms, other firms 
and the Bank of Japan.   Thus, a disproportionate fraction of these unpaid earthquake 
bills were related to debts owed by Suzuki companies, and the Suzuki zaibatsu’s bank, 
the Taiwan Bank, accounted for fully 58% of these unpaid promissory notes.
34   
  When the Japanese Diet was debating how to absorb these unpaid promissory 
notes, Suzuki hired lobbyists to sway votes.  The campaign backfired, and Suzuki’s 
financial problems were disclosed by some political leaders.  Suzuki companies 
completely lost their ability to discount their notes.  The final law the Diet passed on 
March 23
rd,1927 was accompanied by the resolution to provide a complete rescue 
package for Taiwan Bank.  On March 24
th, the Taiwan Bank announced that it was 
severing its ties with the Suzuki group entirely. The sudden abandonment of Suzuki 
companies by the Taiwan Bank forced many of those firms to default on payments 
                                                 
33 Bank of Japan Report (2001). 
34 Both Taiwan and Korea Banks were given special status by the Japanese government.  
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due the Mitsui Bank and other banks.  Angered by the Taiwan Bank’s move, the 
managers of other banks called in their Taiwan Bank loans, putting the Taiwan Bank 
(once again) on the verge of bankruptcy.  
  Suzuki collapsed on April 2
nd in 1927.  On April 13
th, the Bank of Japan, 
despite the above resolution, refused to mount a second rescue of the Taiwan Bank.  
Cha (2001) argues that a determination by the central bank to end the gold embargo 
figured large in this decision, but the politics of the situation surely also played a key 
role.  The Upper House of the Japanese Parliament voted down a special provision to 
rescue Taiwan Bank, arguing that the measure was unconstitutional, and the Japanese 
cabinet fell on April 17
th.  The Taiwan Bank closed temporarily on April 18
th.  This 
resulted in an immediate financial panic throughout Japan. 
 
The Disposition of the Remains 
Although Suzuki went out of business because of its inability to pay its promissory 
notes, it never actually went into bankruptcy.  After it closed, Suzuki moved all its 
business to another company, Nissho, reorganized as a stock company in 1928.
35  The 
original Suzuki stock company undertook all repayment and restructuring activities, 
and was dissolved in 1933 after it had paid back all of its debts.  During this 6-year 
restructuring period, no creditors’ meeting took place and the Japanese courts never 
declared Suzuki bankrupt.  In their investigations, Suzuki’s creditors found no book 
fudging whatsoever and accepted that the collapse was an honest financial and 
management failure.  They unanimously agreed to settle all remaining accounts 
                                                 
35 Nissho Company continued as a general trading firm, and merged with Iwai Trading Company in 
1968 to form the present Nissho Iwai Corporation.  Their web-site 
(http://www.nisshoiwai.co.jp/ni/e/index2.html) presents their corporate history involving the Suzuki 
Shoten.    
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privately.  In this process no overseas clients of Suzuki’s were adversely affected 
either. 
         Because the failure was purely financial and managerial, the Suzuki pyramid 
still contained mainly economically viable firms with significant assets.  These, 
realizing Kaneko’s worst nightmares, were divided among the other major zaibatsu as 
Suzuki debts were settled.  The primary buyers were Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which 
accumulated all of Suzuki’s most promising business production units as well as the 
Taiwan Bank.  This consolidation significantly raised concentration ratios in certain 
industries.  For example, 84% of Taiwan’s sugar production was now under the 
control of three zaibatsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Fujiyama.  Intangible assets, notably 
the exclusive distribution rights that Suzuki owned for many commodities and goods, 
were transferred to Mitsui Bussan (Mitsui and Co.) and Mitsubishi Shoji (Mitsubishi 
Corp.), the general trading firms of those groups.  
  Suzuki had been willing to take risks.   The established zaibatsu groups, such 
as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, had been much more cautious.  After acquiring 
Suzuki’s chemical companies - including plants, patents, engineers and scientists - 
Mitsui established a major ammonia production facility.  Mitsui clearly used research 
conducted by the former Suzuki companies, whereas Mitsui itself would never have 
paid for such research – at least without large government subsidies.  Thus, although 




                                                 
36 After the collapse of Suzuki, Kaneko set up a holding company, Taiyo Soda, in 1931, with which he 
began another business career.  He died in Borneo in 1944, while engaged in aluminum processing.  
Takahata was at his death bed.  Kaneko, with help from Nissho developed Taiyo Soda (renamed as 
Taiyo Sangyo in 1939) into a holding firm controlling twenty five companies, including Kobe Steel 
Works. 
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Post Mortem 
Kaneko (1928) himself reflected on the collapse of the Suzuki  zaibatsu and 
summarized the reasons for its collapse.  In Kaneko’s opinion, a highly centralized 
management system imposed on widely disparate firms prevented proper monitoring, 
and was the most important reason for Suzuki’s ruin.  Second, Kaneko reflects that 
Suzuki companies had too much debt capital requiring too high interest payments 
given the recessionary environment, noting that the “high cost of debt capital 
subsequently killed us.”   
  Note, however, that the two reasons Kaneko lists correspond precisely to the 
differences noted above between the structure of the Suzuki pyramid and those of 
zaibatsu that survived, such as Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi.  Suzuki’s 
organizational weakness, as pointed out by Kaneko himself, was its overly centralized 
management.    Suzuki’s financial weakness stemmed from its extensive use of debt 
financing from a single bank.  Kaneko, quoted by Nissho (1968), explains that: “[t]he 
profits earned by Suzuki Shoten’s hard work should be monopolized by the Suzuki 
family.  I would rather borrow money from banks than pay profits out as dividends.”  
The two reasons were not unrelated, for this statement is often interpreted to mean 
that Kaneko wanted to maintain Suzuki family control in order to maintain his own 
control.   This left Taiwan Bank’s loan portfolio highly concentrated in Suzuki 
companies – and essentially an organ bank for the group.  In contrast, by 1912 most 
Mitsui companies were already able to grow on retained earnings and equity issues.  
The Mitsui Bank was not needed as an organ bank, and began lending to companies 
outside the Mitsui group.  Table 9 shows quite stable relationships between deposits 
and loan balances for the six largest zaibatsu banks for the early 1930s. 
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[Table 9 about here] 
 
  A third reason, which Kaneko does not mention, for Suzuki’s collapse, is that 
he expanded the Suzuki group too fast and in the wrong directions.  He certainly 
failed to f oresee the chronic weakness of the Japanese economy through the 1920s.  
Had the 1920s economy in Japan resembled that in the US, Suzuki might well have 
prospered.  However, in retrospect, the more risk-averse strategies of the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo groups proved superior.  Moreover, Suzuki missed some of 
the most profitable new industries of the 1920s, such as electrical machinery.  The 
Suzuki group was vulnerable to a downturn because, unlike Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and 
Sumitomo, it lacked a reliably highly profitable mining operation to serve as cash 
cows for the entire groups during downturns.  It is also sometimes argued that the lack 
of mining in its industrial portfolio also prevented Suzuki from entering electrical 
machinery industries which provided an additional financial cushion for the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo zaibatsu.   
  A fourth reason, which Kaneko also fails to note, is that he was quite ham-
fisted at lobbying.  An interesting aspect of Kaneko’s personality was that he 
apparently  had no interest in personal wealth.  He did not benefit personally in any 
way from his business dealings.  He likewise could not comprehend that politicians 
might value money, and refused to make any payments to bureaucrats or politicians.   
During the Meiji period, rent-seeking investments seem to have been important 
aspects of the business strategies of the other zaibatsu, and probably played some role 
in Mitsui and Mitsubishi taking over state mining operations.  Tousuke Fukuzawa 
(1868-1938), a successful entrepreneur and well-known industrialist responsible for 
much of the development of Japan’s electric power industry in the early decades of  
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the 20
th century, argues that this was the biggest reason for Suzuki’s collapse, and that 
Japan should thank Kaneko deeply for not contributing to political corruption.
37  A 
less laudatory interpretation is that Kaneko relished power rather than wealth, and 
failed to understand that others viewed life differently.  In any event, Kaneko’s lack of 
pre-existing political connections certainly hurt him, and his last minute attempts to 
manipulate the Diet backfired badly.   
 
The Culling of the Zaibatsu and Their Banks 
Although the fall of the Suzuki zaibatsu was the most spectacular, it was not an 
isolated event.  The 1920s depressions inflicted decisive blows on many other 
pyramidal groups.  The Nakazawa, Watanabe, and Matsusaka zaibatsu also collapsed 
about the same time as the Suzuki zaibatsu.   
Like Suzuki, these families preserved control at the cost of using loans from 
their group banks to finance group companies.  Thus, like the Taiwan Bank, the 
Nakazawa, Watanabe, and Matsusaka banks were organ banks of their zaibatsu - 
heavily dependent on interest payments from their respective group companies.  
When key non-financial companies in each of these zaibatsu encountered financial 
difficulty, the group bank failed and the rest of the zaibatsu then collapsed. 
  Moreover,  these organ banks were located deep in their pyramids.  
Consequently, tunneling would have concentrated losses and debts in the banks, with 
income and assets rising toward the apex firms.  In contrast, the banks of the Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi zaibatsu were located near the apexes of those pyramidal 
groups.  Consequently, tunneling would have concentrated income and assets in the 
banks, with losses and debts sinking toward the lower tier firms.   
                                                 
37 Fukuzawa (1930) regards Kaneko more highly than Iwasaki, Mitsubishi zaibatsu’s founder.  
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  Noting this pattern, Kato(1957) proposes the so-called organ bank hypothesis.  
This hypothesis holds that certain banks were excessively tightly connected their 
zaibatsu industrial companies, made easy loans to those companies, failed, and caused 
the Showa financial crisis in 1927. Okazaki and Yokoyama (2001) present empirical 
evidence supporting this hypothesis.   
  Since the stability of a country’s banking system has positive externalities, 
there may be a public policy lesson here.  Countries whose major banks are parts of 
pyramidal groups should encourage the positioning of banks near the apexes of those 
groups.    
  
5.    The Centrally Planned Economy under  the Military 
Government 
As the economy staggered, an anti-westernization backlash grew.    In part, this was a 
result of Japan’s successful adoption of many Western ideas.  Japanese, now educated 
and middle class, chafed at Western arrogance when the Americans and British 
rejected Japan’s proposal for a Racial Equality Clause in the League of Nations 
Covenant. A revival of conservative and nationalistic feelings renewed interest in 
bushido.   
Japan had taken Taiwan from China in 1895, gained a foothold in Manchuria 
by defeating Russia in 1905, annexed Korea in 1910, and installed the Emperor of 
China in a puppet government in Manchuria in 1931. These victories amid economic 
stagnation elevated the prestige of the military and weakened that of the political and 
business elite.   
Emboldened, the military slowly took control over the government by 
assassinating civilian politicians.  Navy and army officers soon held most important  
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public offices, including that of prime minister. Japan attacked China in 1937, and 
quickly conquered Hong Kong, Indochina, Singapore, Indonesia and Burma, 
proclaiming a new Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.    
To support the war effort and to further consolidate its power, the military 
government enacted a series of laws that stripped shareholders of their corporate 
governance powers.  Japan was soon a rigidly centrally planned economy.  Although 
zaibatsu families retained titular ownership of control blocks, they had no say in the 
management of companies and dividends were outlawed so that earnings could be 
reinvested patriotically.  The military government denigrated the families’ objections 
as unpatriotic shareholder fixation on current dividends.  Thus, by 1945, Japan had an 
economy little different from that of Russia in the 1920s.
38  
 
The Military Build-Up 
By the mid 1930s, Japan was recovering from its prolonged bout of depressions. In 
part, this was because the yen had depreciated sharply after Japan left of the gold 
standard, triggering a surge in textile exports.
39  This depreciation also gave domestic 
heavy industry and chemical industry firms an advantage over imports, allowing them 
to expand rapidly.   
In part, the recovery stemmed from Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi’s 
adoption of  Keynesian policies at the end of 1931, when the government issued 
deficit covering bonds underwritten by the Bank of Japan that were then sold to city 
banks.  The government spent the proceeds on public works and military industries, 
which further increased demand for heavy and chemical industry products.   
                                                 
38 See (Okazaki (1945) for details.   
39 Japan abandoned the gold standard in September 1917, along with many other countries.  After 
World War I, many other countries promptly returned to the gold standard, but Japan delayed doing so 
until January 1930.  It then abandoned the gold standard again in December 1931.  For details, see 
Ogura (2002).   
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And in part, the recovery was due to the Manchurian Incident of September 
1931, when a bomb of unknown origin ripped through a Japanese-built railway near 
Shenyang (then known as Mukden).  The Japanese Kwantung army (also known as 
Kantogun) guarding the railway used the incident as a pretext to occupy Southern 
Manchuria despite the government’s direct order to withdraw.  The situation required 
a military build-up that elevated demand for chemicals and heavy industry products. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Large military spending seemed increasingly linked to economic prosperity in 
the minds of business leaders, politicians, and ordinary Japanese.   
When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the Japanese 
government mobilized the economy,  emphasizing military-related industries and 
shifting production away from light industries, such as the textiles.  Table 10 
illustrates.  This rapid change in Japan’s industrial structure, in turn, had a major 
impact on the corporate sector.   
  The older zaibatsu groups - Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi  - expanded 
aggressively into heavy industries and chemicals from the early 1930s on, financing 
these expansions with equity issues.  These operations ended up being their most 
profitable ones in the 1940s, and account for about thirty percent of the fifty most 
profitable firms, as shown in Table 11.  Thus, while the number of established 
zaibatsu member firms in the top fifty did not change greatly, their industrial 
composition did.   
 
[Tables 11, 12, and 13about here]  
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Until the early 1930s the first-tier subsidiaries of the zaibatsu pyramids, except 
Mitsubishi, were almost wholly owned by members of the zaibatsu family and the 
apex firms collectively, as shown in Table 12.    In the 1930s, however, the zaibatsu 
allowed these first-tier subsidiaries to go public. This was because the families saw 
immense profit opportunities in rapidly growing military-related industries if they 
moved quickly, as illustrated in Table 13.  In fact, superfluous stakes in control chains 
throughout the established zaibatsu pyramids were sold to the public to raise capital 
for expansion.  Thus, the stakes of zaibatsu companies in their subsidiaries declined 
significantly between 1929 and 1943.  
 
[Table 14 about here] 
  
Table 11 shows that the newer zaibatsu were also present in these profitable 
sectors, with eight of their affiliates among the most profitable firms of 1943.  Most 
notably, Japan Industries represents Nissan, Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer represents 
Nichitsu, Nippon Soda represents Nisso, Mori Industrial Enterprises represents Mori, 
and the Physical and Chemical Research Institute represents Riken.  Recall that many 
of these newer zaibatsu groups were developed by single entrepreneur chemists or 
engineers.   
State control and other reasons are responsible for the reduction in the number 
of independents from 29 to 14 among the most profitable firms in Table 11.  Of 
particular note is the change in the composition of 10 largest stockholders of 
independent enterprises, shown in Table 15.  As these firms issued ever more equity 
to finance expansion, their controlling families’ stakes fell.  By 1943, family holding  
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companies’ stakes were less than the stakes of corporate investors.  Financial 
institutions dominated; and state controlled banks, such as the Industrial Bank of 
Japan
40 became the most significant shareholders in many independent companies. 
 
 [Table 15 about here] 
 
Creeping to Serfdom 
The military assumed dictatorial powers over the economy in stages. Thus the latter 
part of the 1930s is called the creeping war economy.  
  This development was possible because the weak economy convinced many in 
Japan, as elsewhere, that democracy and free market capitalism had failed.   Indeed 
this view was widespread among business leaders themselves.  In response to the 
Suzuki failure, the government organized the Council on Commerce and Industry in 
1927.  The Council recommended a thorough cartelization of the economy to allow 
“cooperation” and government educational measures to induce “patriotic economic 
behavior” by consumers.   
The Ottawa Imperial Conference erected tariffs around the British 
Commonwealth, shutting Japan out of her best markets, and the ensuing breakdown of 
trade allowed the Council’s recommendations to move forward.   The 1931 Important 
                                                 
40 The Industrial Bank of Japan was created by the Japanese government in 1900 under the Industrial 
Bank of Japan Act.  This act provided the IJB with ¥10 million in government money as initial capital, 
and granted it the privilege of issuing IBJ long-term bonds (bank debentures) to raise further funds.  
The IBJ began its investment bank operations in 1902.  A 1918 revision of the IBJ Act granted it stock 
underwriting privileges.  Following World War II, the IBJ act was nullified in 1950 and the IBJ became 
an ordinary bank.  Also in 1950, the government passed the Bank Debentures Issuance Act, which 
allowed ordinary banks to issue long-term bonds to raise capital.  In 1952, after the Allied occupation 
ended, the Japanese government abolished the BDI Act and passed the new Long-term Credit Bank Act.  
This Act also provided designated long-term credit banks with the privilege of issuing long-term bonds 
to finance corporate investment.  Under this new act, the IBJ became a long-term credit bank and began 
providing capital to corporations.  The Long Term Credit Bank, the Japan Credit Bank, and the Bank of 
Tokyo also became long-term credit banks under the new LTCB Act.  For further details, see e.g. 
Patrick (1967) and Tamaki (1995).  We are grateful to Richard Sylla for pointing this out.          
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Industries Law sanctioned cartels run by ‘control committees’ of officials, and 
executives would designate crucial industries in which cartels should regulate 
production and prices.  Cartels could be formed in any industry where at least half of 
the firms requested it.  If two thirds of the firms requested cartelization, the remaining 
firms could be forced into the cartel.  The minister could rescind cartel actions only 
with the approval of the ‘control committee’. 
41 The control committees, of course, 
would end up staffed by military personnel.   
 
 The mood of the times is well captured in the writings of Takahashi (1930), 
who blames short-sighted shareholders who care only for high dividends and neglect 
the long term future of the firm.  He declares that   
 
“The primary manifestations of ‘the degeneration of firm management’ were the 
short-sighted attitude towards business management and the inability of management 
to aim at so-called ‘business prosperity for 100 years’ …  [D]egeneration of company 
management was largely caused by the ‘high handed and short sighted selfishness of 
large stockholders’ and the corruption of the board of directors.”
42 
 
He also asserts that corrupt inept directors preoccupied with big bonuses and stock 
manipulation govern Japan’s large companies and that   
 
“It is uncommon to find members of the board of directors who acquired their status 
and position by virtue of their management ability.  A large number of directors get 
                                                 
41 See Fletcher (1989) for details.   
42 As quoted by Okazaki (1994), pp. 4 and 5.  
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their position on the board only because of being large stockholders of the firm or 
having special relations in government circles.”
43  
 
Takahashi thus blames Japan’s economic malaise on corrupt, inept, and entrenched 
directors placed in charge of large companies by dint of family history or political 
rent-seeking.  The military largely accepted these view, and concluded not only that it 
should take over the task of corporate governance, but that there would be broad 
public support for this.  They were correct.   
Thus followed a creeping nationalization of the banking system and the zaibatsu.   
Ironically, Okazaki (1994) argues that zaibatsu firms were actually the better 
performers because their dominant shareholders were more likely to entrust 
governance to professional managers.  Thus, they ought to have been less vulnerable 
to such attacks.  This was not the case.     
The attack was three-pronged.  First, the banking sector was placed under state 
control.  Second, the zaibatsu families were isolated and their control rights had to be 
negated.  Third, a full-fledged Soviet-style system was erected.  It is still a matter of 
debate whether this strategy was planned from the beginning, or whether the military 
government simply acted as opportunities presented themselves. 
  State control encompassed the banking sector in two ways.  First, the 
government proposed to stabilize the sector by implementing a one-local-bank-per-
prefecture policy.  Still traumatized by the recent depressions, the bankers gratefully 
accepted this largesse.  This objective w as achieved by the end of World War II, 
reducing the number of banks from 1,402 in 1926 to 377 in 1937 to only 61 in 1945.  
While this policy did stabilize the banking sector, it also erected an insurmountable 
                                                 
43 As quoted by Okazaki (1994), p. 233.  
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barrier to entry.  Bank financing was now in the hands of a relatively small cadre of 
people, whom the military government could either control or replace.    
At the same time the Japanese government increased the amount of funds 
supplied by the state-owned long-term credit banks, such as the Industrial Bank of 
Japan.  This made the state a major creditor to many industrial companies.   State 
banks also increasingly took equity positions, explaining the observation in Table 11 
that these organizations had became the most significant shareholders in many 
independent companies. 
  Thus, when the cabinet decided in November 1938 to regulate loans, the 
number of banks to be controlled was greatly reduced and their dependence on state 
power was quite evident to all bankers.  Senior Japanese finance personnel were, by 
now, people with Soviet training. 
The military government pried corporate control away from the  zaibatsu 
families in two steps.  Again, it is not clear that this was fully premeditated, though it 
might have been.   
The first step was the conversion of the apex holding companies from limited 
partnerships into joint stock companies.  This was done through inheritance and 
dividend income tax reforms in 1937 and 1938 that made partnerships unviable.  
Dividend income became subject to double taxation – once as corporate income of the 
partnership and again as personal dividend income of the family.  The latter was taxed 
at an especially high rate.
44   However, if the holding company was a joint stock 
company, rather than a partnership, double taxation could be avoided in various 
                                                 
44 The partnership was subject to an income tax of between eighteen and twenty-eight percent, 
depending on the location of business, plus a capital tax.  The same income was then subject to a 
personal income tax with a top marginal rate of sixty-five percent.   
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ways.
45 By 1940, the holding companies at the apexes of all Japan’s major zaibatsu 
had been transformed from partnerships into joint stock companies.     
  At this point, Nissan was favored over other zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo by the military government because its apex firm, unlike 
those of the other major zaibatsu, was held by many shareholders.
46  This favored 
status led to a drastic change in the organization of the Nissan zaibatsu when Nissan 
was renamed the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company, and recapitalized as a 50-50 
joint venture with the Japanese and Manchurian governments.  Manchurian Heavy 
Industry Company was granted a monopoly on all development projects in Manchuria.   
The government also acquired controlling interests in a variety of previously 
independent firms.  However,  zaibatsu firms remained under the control of their 
family shareholders.   
The military government’s second step was to cut off the income of the 
zaibatsu families.  The same November 1938 cabinet decision that regulated loans 
also placed dividends under state regulation.   This was justified as a patriotic measure 
needed to build up Japan’s industries through greater retained earnings.  Since the 
apex companies of the zaibatsu were now joint stock companies, the zaibatsu families 
were entirely dependent on dividends for their income.  This was now sharply 
curtailed.  Thus, Asajima (1984), noting that the Sumitomo group expanded 
dramatically from 1937 to 1945 using retained earnings, remarks that “if all the 
                                                 
45 For details, see Morikawa (1992), p.213.  Corporate income tax was only introduced in Japan in a 
1940  reform, which also increased tax burdens across the board.  See Shiomi (1957) for general 
information on these changes.   Miyamoto (1984) describes the previous tax regime in detail.   
46 Reischauer (1988, p.305) writes that “[b]y the 1920s and 1920s there was wide spread condemnation 
of the zaibatsu, particularly by the supporters of the military, as elements of Western decadence in 
Japanese society, corrupters of the parliamentary system, and money grubbing betrayers of Japan’s 
imperial destiny.”  The lives of many zaibatsu leaders were threatened.  For example, Ikuma Dan 
(1858-1932), a former civil servant and chairman of Mitsui Gomei (Mitsui Partnership), was 
assassinated by young naval officers in front of the Mitsui Bank in Tokyo in 1932.   
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income from dividends is channeled into paid-up capital, the question arises as to 
what the Sumitomo family relied on for income.  This is also unclear at present.” 
47 
On September 13, 1940 the State Planning Ministry, the Kikakuin, announced 
its new Outline of the Establishment of a New Economic System, under which firms 
were ‘set free from the control of shareholders’ and subjected to a system of 
quantitative production orders.  Thus, the Kikakuin set up full-fledged central 
planning system, in which it assumed the role of Gosplan.
48  Under this system, the 
Kikakuin issued production order to Industry Control Boards, or Toseikai, which in 
turn issued orders to individual firms.  The cabinet explicitly commissioned Kikakuin 
to investigate and imitate Soviet best practice.  In all of this restructuring, firms were 
seen as consisting of workers and manager/bureaucrats.  There was no mention of 
shareholders in any of these plans, for they were by now entirely irrelevant.    
The Kikakuin also took control of the banking system, directing banks to 
transfer capital to firms in accordance with the central plan.  The Mitsubishi apex 
company began issuing bonds to obtain the needed funds, while the Mitsubishi Bank 
and Mitsubishi Trust Co. – deviating from their prior practice - began large scale 
lending to other Mitsubishi companies.       
Of course, the same planners who set quantitative targets for output controlled 
the prices of goods and services throughout the economy.  By early 1945 (the war 
ended in August 1945), the state was setting about ten thousand prices.   
By 1942, the economy was in a state of crisis because many firms failed to 
meet production quotas.  Okazaki (1994) writes that the officials at the Kikakuin now 
realized that firms were still thinking about production in terms of making profits, and 
were not willing to ‘bear sacrifices’ despite the removal of stockholder influence.   
                                                 
47 Asajima (1984),  p. 110.   
48 Gosplan (???????) was the command and control section of the Soviet government.  Okazaki (1994) 
states that Kikakuin was explicitly modeled on Gosplan and staffed by Soviet-trained personnel.    
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The government responded in two ways.  First, the February 1943 Outline of 
Emergency Measures for Price Controls organized a system whereby the government 
would raise producer prices through subsidized spending.  Thus, market forces were 
allowed back into the system, though in a very restricted way.  Second, the Munitions 
Corporation Law of 1943 required each company to have one ‘responsible person’ 
who would be ‘accountable’ for the company achieving its production quota.  All 
workers had an unconditional duty to obey all orders of the responsible person.  Thus, 
tougher corporate governance standards were established.   
When the US Occupation Force entered Japan in 1945, they thus came to a 
country that was virtually as centrally planned as many Eastern European countries 
were in 1989.  While economic historians sometimes write that the zaibatsu were 
dismantled and the banking system was reorganized under the US Occupation, this is 
not really the full picture. The zaibatsu families had already lost control, and the 
banking system was already changed beyond recognition from its prewar structure.  
The issue of whether or not to destroy the prewar system was moot.  The real question 
was to rebuild it as it had been or as something different.   
 
6.    Macarthur Brings the Widely Held Firm to Japan 
General Douglas Macarthur, the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) and 
Military Governor of Japan under the US Occupation from 1945 to 1952, shared his 
predecessors’ suspicion of powerful business families, and tried to steer Japan down a 
moderate socialist road.  Although no fan of socialism himself, Macarthur allowed a 
cadre of New Dealers to direct SCAP policies down leftward paths.
49 Prominent 
among these efforts were the reorganization of the banking industry and the 
                                                 
49 Dower (2000) describes Macarthur’s orchestration of anti-communist purges, his vast anti-red 
censorship system, and his distinctly rightwing approach to dealing with unions.   
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restructuring of former zaibatsu member firms as freestanding widely held firms of 
the sort now prevalent in the United States.  Hostile takeovers and greenmail ensued 
under Japan’s brief, but action-packed, adventure in Anglo-American corporate 
governance.    
    
The Agenda of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers 
Following World War II, the U.S. occupation force in Japan oversaw a full scale 
revamping of Japan's corporate and financial systems along the lines of the U.S. 
systems.  This revamping, while immensely complicated, has three key elements that 
relate to the topic at hand.   
First, Banks could no longer underwrite securities.  Although the U.S. 
government exerted considerable pressure for a complete ban on bank ownership of 
non-financial firms' stock, along the lines of U.S. practice, the Allied Forces 
ultimately decided against this.  Banks' share ownership in other companies was 
limited to a 10% stake.  This effectively prevented banks from being situated near the 
apex of a pyramid.   
Second, although the military had stripped the zaibatsu families of meaningful 
ownership of their shares, those shares nonetheless remained on the books.  
MacArthur ordered the former zaibatsu families to disgorge their share holdings in 
1950.  
Third, senior corporate executives of zaibatsu firms were purged.   
 
[Table 16 about here] 
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The primary reasons the SCAP gave to justify the breakup of the zaibatsu had 
to do with their alleged market power.  Thus, the Department of State and the War 
Department jointly report in 1946 that  
 
“The almost complete zaibatsu control of banks and financial institutions prevented 
independent businesses from getting needed financing; zaibatsu-controlled 
distribution systems could cut off the supply of raw materials and supplies needed by 
independent businesses entirely; similarly, selling independent business’s finished 
products outside strictly local markets required the cooperation of the zaibatsu trading 
houses, which largely controlled Japan’s distribution systems; and zaibatsu firms 
were able to cripple small firms by pirating their key employees and skilled workmen.  
These practices, and the independents’ respect for not violating zaibatsu’s territories, 
prevented meaningful competition from existing in Japanese markets.”
50   
 
  The SCAP seemed intent on removing barriers to entry for political as well as 
economic reasons.  T he revamping it supervised was clearly also intended to 
democratize the economy and encourage a new cadre of entrepreneurs.  Hadley (1970, 
p.19) writes that  
 
“[t]he aim of the Allied economic deconcentration program was to give all 
Japanese businessmen the opportunity to engage in the modern sector of the 
economy, that is, to remove those conditions which preserved this sector for 
chosen few, those conditions which in fact made it a private collectivism.”   
 
                                                 
50 Report on the Mission on Japanese Combines, Part I, a report to the U.S. Department of State and 
the U.S. War Department, Washington, D.C., 1946, p.14.    
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Whether zaibatsu would have exercised an unhealthy degree of market power 
in a free-market postwar economy is an academic question, for their market shares 
had grown substantially in the 1930s and 1940s under the controlled economy.    
Historically, Japan always had some sectors of the economy in which  competition 
was keen and entry open.  However, especially after the demise of the Suzuki zaibatsu, 
the remaining large pyramidal groups came to hold substantial market shares in many 
key industries, as shown in Table 5.  Moreover, the central planners of the military 
government had little interest in entrants, and preferred directing the affairs of large 
companies.  Dealing with many companies instead of a few simply made the 
transmission of orders more complicated.   
 
The Incomplete Process of Zaibatsu Dissolution 
To implement Macarthur’s order to “dissolve large industrial and banking combines,” 
the Japanese government established the Holding Company Liquidation Commission 
(HCLC). The HCLC designated ten combines and 83 holding companies for 
dissolution.  The zaibatsu core families and their relatives were ordered to surrender 
their shares in exchange for ten-year nonnegotiable government bonds.  Thus, no 
property was formally confiscated without compensation.  Indeed, the old 
shareholders initially appeared to be generously compensated for their property.  
However, the subsequent inflation reduced the value of the government bonds to very 
little.   
The hired-managers of zaibatsu companies, many of whom were competent, 
were purged from their positions by the SCAP.  This probably created a serious 
shortage of able managers to run Japanese corporations that persisted at least through 
the late 1940s and early 1950s.  More extensive purges in zaibatsu than in other firms  
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might explain Yafeh’s (1995) finding of poorer accounting performance for former 
zaibatsu firms in 1953.  This could also explain markedly depressed values for these 
same firms, as reported by Miyajime (1994, Table 10).   After the occupation ended in 
1952, many purged managers returned in various capacities.   
In contrast to the purgings of corporate executives, Noguchi (1998) reports 
that Japanese bureaucrats were left, to a large extent, untouched.  While 21,000 
managers were purged from other sectors of Japanese society, only 2,000 bureaucrats, 
mostly from the Ministry of the Interior, were chucked.  Most notably, only nine 
bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance were purged.  This was important, for the 
Ministry of Finance worked to alter or circumvent SCAP orders regarding many 
policy matters, often aggressively.  Indeed, Hadley (1970,p.15)  remarks on the deep 
puzzlement the Allied personnel involved in this policy felt at the support business 
groups, individuals, and Japanese government officials provided for this interference. 
Overall, the implemented zaibatsu dissolution policies left considerable wiggle-room 
for the Japanese government to permit Japanese business interests to organize new 
business groups along the lines of former zaibatsu groups.   
For example, we noted above that several alternative definitions of zaibatsu 
have been advanced by Japanese and foreign observers of the Japanese economy.  
This was also true of the non-Japanese personnel supervising the postwar revamping 
of the economy, and this lack of clarity may have been in part responsible for the less 
than complete implementation of the originally intended dissolution plan.  Thus, the 
HCLC decided not to disassemble the group built around Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer 
Company, the Nippon Chisso Hiryo zaibatsu, because its founder had died in 1944 
and it was therefore not really a zaibatsu.
51   
                                                 
51 Hadley (1970), p 21.    
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The SCAP had used market share as the primary determinant of whether a 
zaibatsu was in need of dissolution.  This had several odd effects.  For example, the 
banking sector, in which no single bank held a clearly dominant market share, was left 
relatively untouched throughout the occupation; save that banks had to disgorge their 
shares in non-financial companies.   Many pyramidal structures in non-financial 
sectors also remained in place, and were carried over to the postwar era in the 
formation of vertical keiretsu, also called capital keiretsu.  
Confronted with a deepening Cold War and rising influence of the Soviet 
Union in the Pacific, policymakers in Washington deemphasized Macarthur’s 
restructuring plans, and emphasized the need to reconstruct Japan as rapidly as 
possible to defend the region jointly with the U.S.  This shift in the U.S. policy 
actually became evident when Lidgeway succeeded Macarthur in mid 1950, well 
before the end of the occupation of Japan in April 1952.  The HCLC was thus left to 
its interpretation of its orders and Japanese corporations became more freely able to 
reorient their inter-firm relationships and business strategies.  when  
 
The Subsequent Stock Market Collapse        
The SCAP closed Japan’s stock exchanges in September 1945, and reopened them on 
May 16, 1949.  Table 16 shows the de jure shareholdings of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo and Yasuda zaibatsu in 1945. These shares were sold into the market, 
greatly diluting in the equity of many of the companies involved and sharply reducing 
their share prices.  This dilution occurred because the structures of the zaibatsu 
pyramids contained extensive cross holdings, instances where subsidiaries also hold 
stock in their parent companies or in which subsidiaries hold stock in each other.   
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[Figure 10 about here]   
 
  Figure 10 shows how this occurred.  The upper panel shows a pyramidal 
structure containing cross holdings.  The family controlled firm A controls i ts 
subsidiary B, but B in turn owns shares in the parent firm A.  In the example shown, 
A and B pay each other dividends, and both count the money as income.  Since their 
assets also include their stakes in each other, both firms show dividends and income 
of twice what would be the case were they free standing firms.  Both firms show two 
million shares outstanding, though half are cross-holdings.    
  The lower panel shows what happens after dissolution of the sort implemented 
in Japan by the HCLC.  The shares previously held by the zaibatsu family and the 
cross holdings are appropriated by the HCLC.  The HCLC paid the family, A, and B 
government bonds as compensation for these shares, but inflation quickly eroded 
away most of the value of these bonds.  For simplicity we therefore assume that no 
compensation was paid.  After the dissolution, the only assets in both firms are their 
physical assets, and their only incomes are their operating incomes.  Yet the number 
of shares outstanding has not declined proportionately.  Consequently, the dividend 
per share falls – by fifty percent in the example shown – and the market value of the 
shares falls by the same amount.   
  Cross-holdings of this sort were commonplace and extensive.  For example, 
64% and 59% of the outstanding shares of the apex companies of the Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi zaibatsu, respectively, were owned by Mitsui and Mitsubishi affiliates.   
The holding companies of both the Sumitomo and Yasuda zaibatsu were actually 
entirely owned by their respective zaibatsu affiliates.  Thus, stock prices plunged as  
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the dissolution was announced and as the value of the bonds issued as compensation 
dropped.   
Share prices in the immediate postwar period were also depressed because of 
the extensive damage the war had inflicted on the physical assets of industrial firms.  
Moreover, to begin rebuilding, firms began issuing new shares, adding these to the 
former zaibatsu shares flooding the market.   
Further depressing prices, the SCAP ordered the government to suspend the 
promised payments to munitions suppliers to prevent these firms from profiting off 
their wartime activities.  The Corporation Reconstruction and Reorganization Act of 
1946 allowed firms bankrupted by the non-payment of wartime indemnities to resume 
operations as ‘special account companies’, and also allowed firms’ net losses due to 
official non-payment to be written off.
52  Average paid-in capital-to-total assets ratios 
fell to ten percent by 1950.
53  
 
[Table 17 about here] 
 
Table 17 shows the numbers of new shares issued, as well as the shares brought to the 
stock market by the HCLC for sale.  The shares HCLC brought to the market 
amounted to 30% of the newly issued shares in 1948, 17% in 1949, 5.6% in 1950 and 
0.3% in 1951.
54  
                                                 
52 Hoshi (1995). 
53 Ministry of Finance (1983). 
54 These shares were placed directly with specific investors, often former company employees, who 
could then sell them after the stock markets reopened in 1949..  For exa mple, Mitsui Bussan, prior to 
its  (dissolution, had 7,050 employees. Many of these workers, who lost their jobs after the dissolution, 
set up new companies to take over their former employers’ business.  SCAP prohibited any new 
company from employing more than one hundred workers, not including executives, who formerly 
worked for either Mitsui Bussan or Mitsubishi Corporation; and prohibited any new company from 
involving in any way more than one person who was a manager of any rank, consultant or executive of 
either Mitsui Bussan or Mitsubishi Corporation.  Former employees of Mitsui Bussan are thought to  
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 It is clear that the shares freed by the zaibatsu dissolution order were large 
and had a major impact on the overall stock market.  Although non-zaibatsu firms 
suffered smaller stock price declines because their shares were not diluted, their 
stocks nonetheless fell as the total amount of equity available to the public rose.  Thus, 
firms like Toshiba and Hitachi had considerable difficulty selling newly issued shares, 
which the market priced below par.         
  A number of economic measures were introduced in 1949 to stabilize the 
Japanese economy.  They included fixing the exchange rate and suspending of new 
loans from the Reconstruction Financing Bank.  The latter policy reduced the supply 
of funds available to Japanese industry, increased interest rates, and induced even 
more firms to issue equity.  This, on top of the other factors listed above, triggered a 
collapse of the Japanese stock market.  Table 18 shows the drop in stock prices from 
1949 to 1950.  These stock price fluctuations are also evident in price to capital stock 
ratios and market to book ratios, shown in Table 19.  
 
 
[Tables 18 and 19 about here] 
 
  Over the next few years, firms shied away from further diluting their equity by 
issuing shares at the prices prevailing.   During the period 1950-1954, new issues 
accounted for less than 20% of Japanese industrial firms’ external financing.  Short 
term bank debt was now becoming the main source of corporate financing.     
However, at the end of the occupation, Japan was a widely held economy.  
The number of shareholders rose from 1.7 million in 1945 to 4.2 million in 1950.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
have set up as many as 220 small companies to take over former Mitsui Bussan business while 
satisfying the legal requirement.  The corresponding figure for the Mitsubishi Corporation was 140.  
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zaibatsu dissolution by SCAP was accompanied by a massive re-distribution of the 
stocks of Japanese corporations.
55  The shares transferred from the zaibatsu families 
to the public by the HCLC amounted to over 40% of all corporate assets in Japan.  
The consequence of this massive transfer of shares was a widely diffused ownership 
across much of the Japanese corporate sector, with individual shareholders holding 
70% of the outstanding shares of typical Japanese corporations in 1949 and 1950.
56  
 
The New legal Framework for Shareholders 
The SCAP also supervised the enactment of new laws that would shape Japan’s future 
business activities.   
  The Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 was actually also an anti-pyramid law.  It 
prohibited the establishment of holding companies, 25% or more of whose asset base 
consists of the stock of other firms; manufacturing firms’ owning the stock of other 
firms; and financial institutions’ owning more than 5% of other firms.  Subsequently, 
this law was frequently amended in response to corporate lobbying.   
An amendment in 1949 allowed manufacturing firms to own other firms, 
permitting the formation of vertical (capital) keiretsu, in which large manufacturers 
partly own other manufacturers.  A 1953 amendment increased the limit of banks’ 
ownership of industrial firms from the original 5% to 10%.  This 10% limit was 
reduced to 5% again in 1987.  For most practical purposes these limits had never been 
a barrier for Japanese banks intent upon exercise corporate governance power over 
their client firms, particularly those under financial distress.   
  The Securities Trading Act of 1948 was designed to protect small shareholders.  
An auditor system was also established in 1948, followed by a set of c orporate 
                                                 
55 Some authors have found some analogy between this historical event and more contemporary 
privatization of government-owned corporations.  See e.g. Yafeh (1995).     
56 Bisson (1954).    
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accounting principles in 1950.  In 1951, new depreciation rules ended firms’ freedom 
to determine their own depreciation rates and methods.  These initiatives were 
significant, since prewar Japan had no serious shareholder rights, accounting 
standards, auditing procedure rules, public disclosure rules, or depreciation rules.
57    
The Japanese commercial code was also revised in 1950 to give small 
shareholders rights to access company books and records and to establish the 
fiduciary duties of directors to shareholders.  However, the government defined a 
small shareholder as one with at least 5% equity ownership.  In subsequent years, 
Japanese banks intervening in their client firms’ management often used this rule. 
 
Anglo-American Corporate Governance  
An active market for corporate control developed quickly.  Hostile takeover bids 
became frequent events, and many were launched against former zaibatsu firms - 
including Taisho Marine and Mitsui Real Estate.  In response to these pressures, the 
managers of firms from each former zaibatsu began to act as a group – coordinating 
white knight and white squire defensive arrangements to protect their former affiliated 
companies from hostile takeovers.   
These coordinated actions were possible because top managers had 
constructed postwar analogs to the Family Councils that had coordinated zaibatsu 
affairs prior to the military government’s takeover of the economy.  Thus, former 
Mitsubishi firms’ presidents began having regular Friday luncheon meetings in June 
1946, immediately after the Mitsubishi Family Council was formally abolished.  The 
Sumitomo group began their Presidents’ Council in 1949, and the presidents of the 
former Mitsui companies formed their Presidents’ Club around 1950.  Subsequently, 
                                                 
57 See Miyajima (2000).    
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these regular meetings of the presidents of former zaibatsu companies all came to be 
called Presidents’ Clubs.   
  One well-known example is the hostile takeover of  Shirokiya Department 
Stores.  Hideki Yokoi, one of the most well-known corporate raiders in postwar Japan, 
had grown rich as a merchant dealing with MacArthur’s General Headquarters (GHQ) 
and, allegedly, in the black market created by the prewar price controls.  With a huge 
cash hoard, Yokoi launched takeovers of company after company.   
In 1953 he purchased more than 40% of the outstanding shares of the 
Shirokiya, a department store company.
58   Yokoi then organized a general 
stockholders’ meeting, at which won control of the board.  Shirokiya sued Yokoi, and 
four days later Yokoi lost control of the company.  Yokoi had to ask Keita Goto, then 
the CEO of Tokyu, for mediation.    Writing in 1960, Yokoi reflected on the benefit of 
his takeover to Shirokiya, noting that 
 
“I sacrificed myself to do the best for Shirokiya which now is in such great shape; 
without my takeover and the following business intervention by Keita Goto of the 
Tokyu group, Shirokiya would have been unable to increase its capacity and would 
have either become a third-rate department store or an office building, closing its 300-
year history.” 
   
Yokoi continued launching corporate takeovers over the following two 
decades.  After Shirokiya, he mounted raids on Toa Oil, Daikyo Oil, Imperial Hotels, 
Tokai Shipping Line, Toyo Sugar, Shibaura Sugar, Taito Sugar, Dainippon Sugar, and 
many other companies.  He died in 1998 at the age of 85. 
                                                 
58 Its major property is now a part of the Tokyu department store in Nihonbashi.    
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A key event in the development of the Anglo-American system in Japan was 
the raid by Kyujiro Fujinami against Youwa Properties.  By 1952 Fujinami, by then a 
well-known corporate raider, had purchased 250,000 of the 7 20,000 outstanding 
shares of Youwa Properties, a company that had managed landholdings and other 
properties for Mitsubishi group.  Fujinami, a former security guard at the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, demanded seats on the board of Youwa.  The Mitsubishi Bank, together 
with the companies run by other members of the Mitsubishi Presidents’ Council 
offered to pay greenmail and buy back all the shares Fujinami had acquired at a price 
of ¥1600 per share, well above the previous market price of ¥240.  This coordinated 
action was necessary because Japanese law prohibited firms from repurchasing their 
own stock.  Youwa thus could not pay its own greenmail.  Mitsubishi group firms 
each bought a small block of shares from Fujinami to avoid contravening the Anti-
Monopoly Law of 1947.
59   
This event is thought to have triggered the realization by top executives that 
corporate raiders could be blocked by establishing sufficiently large crossholding 
among former zaibatsu firms.  The basic insight was that, if each former Mitsubishi 
zaibatsu firm had owned a little stock in every bother former Misubishi zaibatsu firm, 
the members of the Mitsubishi Presidents Club would collectively vote control blocks 
in every former Mitsubishi firm.  These firms would then all be safe from hostile 
takeovers, the need to pay greenmail would disappear, and the company presidents 
would have secure tenure in their jobs.   
This is a variant of what, in Anglo-Saxon takeover parlance, is called the white 
knight or white squire defense.  In the white knight defense, the target of a hostile bid 
arranges to be taken over instead by a friendly company that will safeguard the 
                                                 
59 Subsequently, in 1953 Mitsubishi Estates, Mitsubishi’s main land development company, absorbed 
both Youwa and another Mitsubishi realtor, Kantou Properties.    
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positions of the target’s top executives.  In the white squire defense, the target 
arranges for a friendly company to purchase temporarily a large enough block of 
target stock to prevent the hostile takeover from succeeding.  To these, we can now 
add the  keiretsu defense, where a cadre of friendly companies each take a small 
position in the target such that these positions, taken together, add up to majority 
control and thus block the hostile takeover.    
 
7.  Self-assembling Keiretsu  
Japan’s postwar keiretsu formed in two waves.  In both waves, defensives against 
corporate takeovers appear to have been the primary motive.  The first wave, 
discussed above, took place in the 1950s, and involved the assembly of  keiretsu 
comprising the former member firms of the old Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo 
zaibatsu.  The second wave, in the 1960s, saw the creation of three new horizontal 
keiretsu. The Fuji  Bank organized the Fuyo keiretsu by orchestrating a network of 
intercorporate share placements to insulate its client firms’ managers from hostile 
takeovers.  Simultaneously, the Sanwa Bank constructed the Sanwa keiretsu and the 
Daiichi Kangyo Bank (DKB) constructed the Dai Ichi Bank keiretsu. In both cases, 
the motive was again to insulate the managers of its client firms from hostile 
takeovers.   
Each keiretsu firm has a ‘main securities firm’ or kanji geisha, with which it 
has a long term relationship.  These kanji geisha usually hold crossholdings equity 
certificates in their vaults.  Thus, one firm cannot sell its crossholdings in another  
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without notifying the kanji geisha, which then notifies the other firm.  Hence there is 
a credible promise to be a ‘stable shareholder’.
60  
  Recent work by Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) contests much of the gushing 
praise bestowed upon Japan’s  keiretsu by students of corporate strategy, such as 
Porter (1990).  While we concur that many utopian descriptions based on anecdotal 
evidence about the alleged socially optimal cooperative behavior of keiretsu firms and 
their stakeholders are highly suspect, we do not agree with the contention of Miwa 
and Rameseyer that keiretsu are fables.
61  Morck and Nakamura (1999) document a 
clear p attern of repeated bailouts of weak  keiretsu firms, but not of otherwise 
similarly troubled independent firms.  They also describe the historical construction of 
keiretsu as anti-takeover devices, a topic to which we give considerable weight below. 
Below, we shall also argue that keiretsu were genuinely important as rent-seeking 
organizations.  Keiretsu firms - and especially keiretsu main banks – were remarkably 
successful at shaping Japanese institutions to their advantage.  Thus, we argue that 
keiretsu are a genuinely important feature of postwar Japan, but their role is primarily 
to entrench top corporate management and to safeguard a stultifying stability in 
Japan’s list of leading corporations.      
Modern Japanese keiretsu can be divided into two genres – horizontal keiretsu 
and vertical keiretsu.   
 
Horizontal Keiretsu 
As noted above, takeover defense arrangements led to groups, wherein member firms 
were owned collectively by all the other firms in the group through a multitude of 
                                                 
60 See Sheard, Paul.  Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance.  In Masahiko Aoki and 
Ronald Dore, eds. The Japanese Firm:  Sources of Competitive Strength.  Clarendon Press 
61 Note also that Gerlach (1992), Lincoln  et al (1992, 1996), and other quantitative sociologists 
typically find that keiretsu connections are important in unconditional multivariate data analysis.    
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small equity stakes.  These groups, called horizontal keiretsu, re-created for their 
member firms top managers the freedom from outside shareholder pressure the 
zaibatsu had provided.  Moreover, since these new groups of firms lacked a family 
exercising corporate control through a family holding company, horizontal keiretsu 
also freed top managers from oversight by a controlling shareholder.  Thus, member 
firms of the keiretsu of postwar Japan were similar to the widely held firms described 
by Beale and Means (1932), for their top managers were accountable only to 
themselves.   
But horizontal keiretsu took the Berle and Means firm a step further.  Because 
a majority of their companies’ stock was in the hands of white squires, or stable 
investors, the managers of  keiretsu member firms had no need to fear corporate 
raiders, proxy contests at shareholder meetings, or institutional investor pressure, 
They were free to run their firms as the wanted, without regard for share value, or its 
determinants such as profits and dividends.  Keiretsu top managers were thus more 
insulated from shareholder pressure that was possible in even the most widely held 
firm.   
[Figure 11 about here] 
   The stylized structure of a horizontal keiretsu is illustrated in Figure 11.  Note 
that the intercorporate stakes involved are all individually quite small, so that each 
firm looks superficially like it is widely held.  However, only a minority of the stock 
in each of the companies is left available to public shareholders, and thus to potential 
raiders.   
  Moreover, as rules against pyramids were relaxed, the core member firms of 
each  keiretsu began establishing new pyramids, with themselves as the apex firm.  
Thus, horizontal keiretsu in contemporary Japan are best thought of as clusters of core  
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firms, each  of which controls its own pyramid of publicly traded subsidiaries in a 
substructure akin to a prewar widely held zaibatsu.  It is only the core firms that 
collectively control a majority of each other’s shares through a dense network of 
individually tiny intercorporate equity blocks.   
 
Vertical Keiretsu 
A second genre of  keiretsu, called vertical  keiretsu, exhibits a more classically 
pyramidal structure of intercorporate equity holdings.    Indeed, some modern 
vertical keiretsu are simply industrial zaibatsu that escaped dissolution.  These include 
Shibaura Manufacturing Works (now Toshiba) and Hitachi, Ltd.  Shibaura was a 
second tier member of the Mitsui zaibatsu and the most important electric appliances 
manufacturer in prewar Japan.  In 1939, it spun off twelve supplier firms and acquired 
equity blocks in eight additional companies with which it had close customer-supplier 
relationships.  Toshiba executives often served their boards of eight 8 companies.
62   
Hitachi was an integral part of the Nissan zaibatsu.  By 1937 Hitachi had set up its 
own vertically integrated group with nine supplier companies.
63  Many of these 
Toshiba and Hitachi suppliers still exist and are now members of their respective 
vertical keiretsu. 
  However, the ranks of vertical keiretsu also contain new groups.  These new 
vertical keiretsu arose after World War II in certain manufacturing industries, such as 
automobiles and electric appliances, where product assembly could be divided into 
discrete steps, each to be carried out by a separate member firm.  Again, takeover 
defenses through the preemptive placement of blocks of stock with white squires was 
probably a key motive in their original formation. 
                                                 
62 Tamaki (1976, p.154-155) describes Toshiba’s relationships with these firms in more detail.    
63 See Tamaki (1976), p. 399.  
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Vertical keiretsu are organized more as pyramids than are horizontal keiretsu.  
An apex firm holds control blocks of equity a first tier of key suppliers.  Each of these 
suppliers holds control blocks in its suppliers, and those companies can hold control 
blocks in yet another tier of suppliers.   
Despite their similarity to prewar industrial  zaibatsu, there are some 
differences that justify a new term for vertical keiretsu.  Unlike industrial zaibatsu, 
vertical keiretsu also feature dense fogs of small intercorporate equity stakes of any 
number of member firms in each other, much like the patterns observed in horizontal 
keiretsu.  For example, Toyota Motors owns controlling blocks in the range of fifteen 
to thirty percent in each of its most important parts suppliers.  Nonetheless, only a 
minority of the stock in these suppliers is available to public investors, for holdings by 
other members of the Toyota keiretsu bring the total stakes of stable shareholders 
above fifty percent in each case.  The Toyoda family controls Toyota Motors itself.
64  
Some of these suppliers are spin-offs from Toyota Motors itself or from an existing 
keiretsu member firm.  Others are independent firms that find it advantageous to 
cement their alliances with the Toyota keiretsu by selling a control block to Toyota or 
a Toyota firm and so joining the Toyota keiretsu.   
But perhaps a more important difference is that the apex firm in an industrial 
zaibatsu clearly directed activities in all the member firms of the pyramid.  In contrast, 
vertical keiretsu firms are alleged only to coordinate decision-making with the firms 
directly above and directly below them in the pyramid.  This decentralized planning is 
said to be possible because the vertical integration in vertical keiretsu is much tighter, 
with no superfluous firms that are not direct parts of the production chain leading to 
the final products of the apex firm.  Industrial zaibatsu, in contrast, often contained 
                                                 
64 As discussed above, Toyota Motors was itself spun off from Toyota Jido Shokki, a loom maker.    
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firms whose activities were disjoint from their main production chains, and even firms 
in entirely unrelated industries.    
 
Other Firms    
In addition, modern Japan still has local zaibatsu that survive in various forms, having 
escaped the notice of the SCAP and the HCLC.  In some cases, the same families that 
controlled these groups prior to the war retain their control blocks in the apex 
companies.  One example is the Ito group of Nagoya, which continues to run 
Matsuzakaya department stores.  Others are the Katakura group of Nagano, whose, 
Katakura Industries retains an important presence in textiles, the Yasukawa group of 
Fukuoka, whose Yasuoka Electric remains an important maker of electric appliances, 
and the Mogi group, based in Chiba prefecture, which controls Kikkoman, the soy 
sauce maker, and other firms.
65  
Finally, just as there were firms in prewar Japan that were not parts of the 
great family keiretsu, so there were firms in postwar Japan that are not within any 
horizontal keiretsu.  Some have roots in the prewar period.  For example, Masatoshi 
Ito joined his small family clothing business in Tokyo, which had began in 1920, and 
developed it into Ito Yokado, the largest retail chain in Japan and owner of the Seven 
Eleven chain.  Other essentially independent firms are entirely postwar phenomena.  
Prominent examples include Honda and Sony.   
The members of the President Clubs of the six former zaibatsu based keiretsu 
groups (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo (formerly Yasuda), Sanwa and Daiichi-
Kangyo) provided only 4% of the total employment of all Japanese listed firms in 
non-finance sectors for the period 1986-1990 but owned in 1990 15% of the total 
                                                 
65 See e.g. Fruin (1983).    
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assets (14% in 1986) and 17% of the total paid-in capital (14% in 1986).  Also, in 
1990, they owned 26% of the outstanding shares of all listed firms (24% in 1986), 
provided 37% of corporate debt of all listed firms (39% in 1986) and provided 45% of 
the directors of the boards of all listed firms throughout the period 1986-1990.
66   
Independent Japanese firms are either private or narrowly held, usually with a 
founding family as the dominant shareholder.  At present, Japan has no large widely 
held firms in the Anglo-American sense of the term.  
 
Definitional Ambiguities 
Like the term zaibatsu, the word keiretsu is deeply flavored with the characteristic 
Japanese taste for ambiguity.  Deciding which, if any, keiretsu a firm belongs to is 
usually straightforward.  However, there are cases where things become somewhat 
convoluted.  For example, in addition to having its own vertical keiretsu is also a full-
fledged member of the Mitsui  keiretsu. Toyota’s president attends meetings of the 
Mitsui Presidents Club, and Toyota considers the Mitsui Bank to be its main bank, 
even though Toyota has no bank debt.  Toyota participates in Mitsui-wide activities 
with other Mitsui firms, such as Toshiba.   
If one stretches the definition of a keiretsu somewhat, even independent firms 
like Sony and Honda are revealed to have group ties.  Thus, Sony is often listed as a 
member of a “quasi-Mitsui group”, as in Okumura (1976, p.183), because of its ties to 
historical dealings with its the Mitsui bank.  The primary reason that Sony is not 
explicitly a member of the Mitsui President Club seems to be that each of these 
horizontal  keiretsu typically allows only one company from each industry.  This 
exclusivity appears to be a holdover from the SCAP’s concerns about high market 
                                                 
66 Toyo Keizai (1991).    
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shares.  Since Toshiba is already a member of the Mitsui Presidents Club, there may 
be no room for Sony.  Likewise, Honda has extensive financial ties to the Tokyo-
Mitsubishi Bank, but does not belong to Mitsubishi’s President Club.  Again, since 
Mitsubishi Motors belongs to the Mitsubishi President Club, there may be no room 
for Honda.  Nevertheless Honda is sometimes listed as a member of a “quasi-
Mitsubishi” group, as in Okumura (1976, p.171).   
  By the end of the 1960s, the widely held firm had disappeared from the 
Japanese economic landscape.  Japan’s brief acquaintance with Anglo-American 
corporate governance was over and its current patterns of corporate ownership were 
essentially in place.   
 
The Former Zaibatsu Banks 
As noted above, banks were exempted from the SCAP’s dissolution efforts because 
their market shares were all deemed acceptably low.  Nevertheless, the former 
zaibatsu families lost ownership of their zaibatsu banks - Teikoku Bank (a merger of 
the former Mitsui and Daiichi Banks), Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo Bank and Yasuda 
Bank.   
  The SCAP continued to use the banks much as the military government had – 
assigning specific banks to “rubber stamp” loans for specific strategically important 
firms.  Thus, firms’ ‘main banks’ in the 1950s tended to be their ‘assigned banks’ in 
the 1940s.  Banks also gained influence as firms damaged by wartime losses were 
restructured.
67  The shareholding culture of prewar Japan faded from collective 
memory, and banks assumed a leading role in the economy.
68   
                                                 
67 See Hoshi et al. (2001) on the postwar continuation of the wartime system and on the banks roles in 
postwar restructuring.    
68 See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).  
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The continuity of the role of the banks, and their ties to state planners, give 
rise to what is sometimes called the ‘1940s theory’.  This theory, due to Okazaki and 
Okuno (1993) and Noguchi (1998), proposes that the current managed market 
economy actually originated in wartime Japan.
69   
Regardless, the SCAP’s attitudes towards long-term financial institutions were 
generally negative, and banks were not allowed to issue bonds to finance their capital 
needs.  In response to a perceived capital shortage in 1952, the year of t he US 
withdrawal, the government passed the Long Term Credit Law, which permitted a 
new type of financial institution, the long-term credit bank, which could issue bonds, 
but not take deposits, to finance loans.  Other banks, henceforth known as ordinary 
banks, could take deposits to finance loans, but not issue bonds.
 70  In response to this 
change, three major new long-term credit banks formed:  the Industrial Bank of Japan, 
the Japan Long-Term Credit Bank and the Nippon Credit Bank.
71  
Most extant banks, i ncluding all the former  zaibatsu banks, chose to be 
ordinary banks. This was because they had large established deposit and short-term 
lending businesses that had generating significant profits before World War II, and 
looked set to do so again.  By remaining ordinary banks, the former zaibatsu banks 
could tap Japan’s high household savings rate and lend the money so raised to large 
corporations on a year-to-year basis.  Despite their formal short-term structure, these 
loans were actually usually long-term  in nature, in that they were rolled over 
indefinitely. 
                                                 
69 See Hamada (1998) for a critique of this view.   
70 At present, this structure of the Japanese banking system is the subject of considerable debate.  There 
has already been a degree of reform and further reforms would appear likely.    
71 The Industrial Bank of Japan, which practiced investment banking since 1900 under the Industrial 
Bank of Japan Act, became an ordinary bank in 1950 when the IBJ Act was repealed.  The IBJ resumed 
its special status as an investment bank in 1952 when the new long-term credit bank act was created. 
For details, see footnote 40.     
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For the most part, the former zaibatsu banks retained, and still retain, their 
prewar business relationships with their fellow former zaibatsu member firms, and are 
now referred to as the main banks of these client firms.  These networks of 
relationships were critical in the formation of the keiretsu in the 1950s and 1960s, for 
the former zaibatsu banks often organized the white squire equity placements that 
constituted the keiretsu.  
This regulatory fragmentation of the Japanese banking system meant that main 
banks sometimes had inadequate capital to accommodate their largest clients 
borrowing needs. In response, the Bank of Japan permitted syndicated loans.    
Under the syndicated bank loan system, a l arge borrower’s main bank took 
charge of organizing a syndicate of banks that could collectively meet the borrower’s 
financing needs.  The main bank apparently was expected to take a lead role in 
monitoring the borrower, to take charge of correcting any impending problems, and to 
take a disproportionately large hit in the event of a default.
72  This pattern continues in 
recent cases of defaulting firms, where the main bank becomes the “special manager” 
of a firm under reorganization. 
Banks were thought to collect substantial private information about each other 
and about Japanese firms in general  via syndicated lending, and to utilize this 
information to promulgate good corporate governance.  However, Morck and 
Nakamura (2000), while documenting increased banker representation on the boards 
of troubled client firms, find no evidence consistent with corporate governance 
improvement.  Indeed, Morck et al.  (2001) argue that banks use their influence on 
boards primarily to maximize the value of their loan portfolios, and that this can 
deviate substantially from firm value maximization and from economic efficiency.   
                                                 
72In contrast, Japanese banks did not usually get involved with rescue operations of distressed client 
firms prior to the early 1950s.  Failing firms were simply liquidated.  See Miyajima (1999).  
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Japan’s large banks also greatly affected the postwar development of the 
financial system.  Bank lobbying is widely believed to underlie the Japanese 
government’s ongoing and virtually complete suppression of the corporate debt 
market, which continued until the 1990s.   Corporate debt issues were proscribed 
unless they were fully backed by real property or explicitly approved by the 
government.  Thus, w hat corporate bonds existed were little more than alienable 
mortgages.  Debentures and other corporate debt securities were outlawed entirely.  
The reason the banks took this route is fairly clear.  They viewed bonds as 
competition both for their depositors’ money and their client firm’s loans.  The reason 
the government accommodated this lobbying is less clear.  Early on, the SCAP 
undertook to promote the stock market, but largely ignored the corporate bond market.  
This may have reflected the wariness of  bond investors hurt by the high postwar 
inflation.  Also, the military government had used the banking system to carry out 
centrally planned capital allocation, and corporate bonds consequently had played 
little role in the wartime Japanese economy.  Managers were not used to issuing debt.  
Nonetheless, the continual proscription of corporate debt issues many decades later 
raises puzzling political economy issues.   
It is hard to escape the conclusion that government and the banks were 
working to preserve m arket power for the country’s major banks.  Market power 
certainly derived from the barriers to competition the prewar and wartime regulators 
had errected.  Banks probably also held an informational advantage that allowed them 
to exercise a degree of market power over their clients, in the sense of Rajan (1992).  
Whatever the precise nature of this market power, it corresponds to a period of great 
stability for the Japanese banking system.  From the end of the war to 1997, no major 
bank failed and there were few bank mergers.  While the strong regulatory hand of the  
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Ministry of Finance may be partially responsible, such stability is certainly also 
consistent with prolonged bank market power.    
Indeed, the two explanations are often intertwined in discussions of postwar 
Japanese banking.  Thus, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003) write that 
 
“the primary purpose of the MOF’s administrative guidance was to suppress 
full-scale competition in each of the compartmentalized financial businesses.  
…  The government was able to utilize the rents accumulated in the banking 
sector as a means of dealing with banks in financial distress..  Specifically, 
regulators relied on the cooperation of private banks in implementing the 
blanket guarantee, and major banks faithfully bore a disproportionate share of 
the costs involved.  …   “[B]y manipulating regulatory measures the MOF 
could do favors to those banks that towed the line and penalize those that 
failed to heed its guidance.”   
 
They argue that the Mitsubishi Bank, for example, got permission to pursue trust 
banking as a reward for rescuing Nippon Trust.  Moreover, the view that banks 
concentrated the financial value of keiretsu within themselves through such practices 
is consistent with the finding of Caves and Uekusa (1976) that group membership 
does not benefit industrial firms, and that any benefits must therefore be captured by 
non-industrial firms – that is banks.     
  Aoki (1994) argues that rents are necessary to motivate proper monitoring by 
banks.  Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that restricting competition is 
beneficial in that this reduces banks’ incentives to maximize shareholder value by 
taking excessive risks in near default situation.  In contrast, Allen and Gale (2000)  
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argue that competition is necessary to reveal which mangers know what they’re doing.  
Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000, 2001a) argue that such competition is responsible for 
the success of independent Japanese manufacturing firms and that its absence explains 
the weakness of keiretsu firms and the failure of its banks.    
  The international success of Japan’s best firms undid this market power.  By 
the 1980s, Japanese multinationals could routinely circumvent these proscriptions by 
having their foreign subsidiaries issue debt abroad.  In response, the government 
relaxed the rules (somewhat) in the 1990s to allow firms whose financial ratios 
exceeded predetermined criteria to issue certain debt securities.
73  It has been alleged 
that this partial deregulation allowed Japan’s best firms to abandon bank loans and 
concentrated low quality debt in the banking system.
74  This argument, while perhaps 
partially true, does not explain the alacrity with which the more profitable firms 
abandoned bank loans as a source of capital.  That the banks were extracting market 
power rents in the provision of capital would explain this rush for the exits.   
 
 
8.  The Value of the Corporate Group Structure 
Japan’s tumultuous corporate history provides some insights into the value of 
corporate groups under different economic circumstances.  Except under the military 
government, entrepreneurs (and querulous relative) were always free to start brand 
new firms as well.  Since both zaibatsu  and keiretsu formed spontaneously, survived 
and prospered, they must have had some competitive advantage over new free-
standing firms.  There are several candidate explanations for this advantage.   
 
                                                 
73 See Morck et al.  (2001).   
74 Aoki and Sheard (1992) and Hoshi et al. (1993) show that the most financially sound firms switched 
to bond financing very quickly.  Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that this undermined the 
banking system.  Boot and Thakor (2000) and Fraser, Ghon, Rhee, and Shin (2002) both describe the 
importance of regulatory restraints on competition to relationship banking.     
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Economies of Scope and Scale 
It has been hypothesized that  zaibatsu and  keiretsu are Japanese solutions to the 
problem of obtaining economies of scope and scale without incurring the agency costs 
to which very large and highly diversified firms can fall prey.
75  However, we now 
know these arguments to be incomplete.  Morck and Nakamura (1999), among others, 
show that the presence of a controlling shareholder in a zaibatsu is not a delivery from 
agency problems, but rather the focus of more and different agency problems, such as 
entrenchment and tunneling.  Moreover, a pyramidal structure can induce a separation 
of ownership from control in lower tier firms that is easily as great as that in typical 
widely held firms.   
Also, the ongoing discussion of the so-called diversification discount casts 
serious doubt on many of the alleged economies of scale and scope to which large, 
diversified firms might aspire.  The reluctance of the zaibatsu to diversify widely in 
the early decades of the Meiji era attest to their Councils’ doubts about these 
economies.  The importance of privatizations and government industrial policies in 
their subsequent diversification also belies the existence of genuine economies.  
Finally, the clear importance of anti-takeover defenses in  keiretsu formation 
undermines arguments that these structures were designed to achieve such economies.   
Efficiency gains from vertical integration in vertical keiretsu are perhaps the 
least implausible such gains in Japanese groups, for these can be related to particular 
innovations, notably just-in-time inventory management and the like.  Such 
techniques that gave Japanese firms a worldwide reputation for efficiency in the 
1980s, and Huson and Nanda (1995) confirm that just-in-time inventory management 
adds value in US firms in which inventories are a large fraction of assets, but not 
                                                 
75 See, for example, Aoki (1988, Ch.6) and Blinder (1991) for a detailed presentation of this view 
regarding vertical keiertsu.  See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), and many 
others for evidence of agency problems associated with large, diversified firms.      
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otherwise.  However, little is actually known about the impact of just-in-time methods 
on the bottom lines of firms in Japan.   
Agency costs normally associated with large, diversified firms are allegedly 
avoided in vertical  keiretsu because each firm in the vertical  keiretsu remains a 
separate company, with its own  shareholders, board, and top management only 
loosely controlled by the firm above it in the pyramid.   
However, it is not clear that this harmonious perfection was actually realized.  
Like horizontal  keiretsu, vertical  keiretsu also shield corporate managers from 
shareholder activism, takeovers, and other checks on managerial freedom of action 
that are thought to induce economic efficiency in other countries.  This became 
overtly evident in the failed 1989 hostile takeover by T. Boone Pickens of Koito 
Manufacturing, a first-tier supplier in the Toyota vertical  keiretsu.  Even after he 
became the largest single shareholder of Koito, Pickens could not put himself on 
Koito’s board.  This was because other members of the Toyota keiretsu collectively 
controlled a majority of Koito’s shares and acted in concert to block Pickens.  Thus, 
vertical keiretsu member firms can plausibly suffer from agency problems associated 
with entrenched management.  They would also appear vulnerable to tunneling, and 
the findings of M orck and Nakamura (1999) are certainly consistent with this 
occurring in the major bank-centered keiretsu.  However, we are unaware of any 
studies that directly confirm or deny tunneling agency problems in vertical keiretsu.  
And lower tier companies are certainly only of remote interest to the apex firm.   
Thus, the premises upon which arguments of these sorts are based are 
increasingly dubious.  The extent of economies of scale and scope in highly 
diversified entities is now doubted, except perhaps in vertical keiretsu, and the alleged 
freedom of corporate groups from agency problems is entirely debunked.    




Khanna and Palepu (2003), in this volume, discussing the family controlled pyramidal 
groups of contemporary India, argue that these zaibatsu-like groups are better able to 
survive and prosper in an economy where market transactions costs are very high.  
They argue that poor institutions greatly elevate such costs in India by allowing 
widespread deception, fraud, and corruption.  Consequently, group firms, which are 
all controlled by the same principal and consequently have greatly reduced incentives 
to cheat each other, can do business more efficiently than free-standing firms that 
depend on markets for capital, managers, labor, suppliers, and customers.  It seems 
plausible that similar conditions might have prevailed in Meiji and Taisho Japan.  In a 
similar vein, even in relatively corruption-free economies, one party to a business 
transaction often has limited information about relevant factors or about the ability of 
the other party to fulfill its promises.  Such information asymmetries can raise the 
costs of doing business significantly.   
Since zaibatsu firms were controlled by a common apex firm, which in turn 
answered to a Family Council, their managers could share information more readily 
than those of free-standing firms, and this might give zaibatsu firms an edge.  Fruin 
(1992, p.101), for example, stresses such production cost minimizing group-wide 
coordination strategies.   Generalizing such stories, it is plausible that the zaibatsu 
headquarters, receiving information from across a wide range of industries, were 
better able than free-standing companies to foresee critical events, react appropriately, 
and develop flexibility strategically  – putting shame upon the heads of the 
government central planners, who seem chronically unable to reproduce this feat.  The 
managers of keiretsu member firms, because of their extensive information about each  
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other, might likewise have been able to do business more efficiently than free-
standing firms.  Member firms of specific keiretsu might benefit from the overall 
good reputation of the group, and therefore be perceived as better business partners 
than free-standing firms. Or shared managerial techniques might give keiretsu firms 
an edge over other firms.   
However, such explanations take a weak institutional environment as given.  
This seems an untenable assumption over the one hundred and thirty five years 
surveyed in this paper.  Did the  zaibatsu and  keiretsu induce or prolong weak 
institutions to maintain their advantage over free-standing firms?  There is little 
evidence that the zaibatsu families acted in this way.  They were generally supportive 
of modernization programs and institutional development such as legal reforms.  
Moreover, it is quite plausible that Japan’s institutions were unavoidably weak as the 
Meiji government strove to undo the damage of the Tokugawa feudal autarky.   
But in postwar Japan, the idea that the  keiretsu m anagers had a hand in 
preserving certain institutional weaknesses becomes more plausible.  It seems clear 
that the intercorporate equity cross holdings that created the keiretsu were designed to 
undermine the market for corporate control and to defeat other corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as proxy fights and institutional investor activism, that are thought 
to induce economic efficiency in other economies.  The role of the banks, the 
keystone firms of the great horizontal keiretsu, in suppressing the corporate bond 
market in postwar Japan also seems consistent with the view that weak institutions 
were a consequence, as well as a cause, of institutional asthenia.   
Thus, we are left with the disturbing prospect that weak institutions foster 
corporate groups, such as zaibatsu and keiretsu, but that these groups then work to 
preserve the institutional weaknesses that let them thrive relative to other firms.    
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A Scarcity of Competence 
A different, though closely related hypothesis is that certain qualities of management 
might have large economies of scale.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) also mention that 
investments in reputation might have large returns to scale.  For example, they argue 
that the Tata family of India invested heavily in acquiring a reputation for fair dealing, 
sometimes at great financial cost.  However, once it established a nation-wide 
reputation for honesty in an otherwise highly corrupt economy, all manner of firms, 
banks, and individuals were willing to pay a premium to do business with Tata firms 
rather than risk being cheated.  A variant of this, widely touted as a justification for 
conglomerate mergers in the United States in the 1960s, is that good management per 
se has increasing returns to scale.  A zaibatsu, like a conglomerate, allows a single 
good manager situated at the apex of the pyramid to apply his talent across a large 
scale and a broad spectrum of businesses, thus making it more valuable to the 
economy as a whole.    
From the Meiji Restoration to the early 20
th century, the zaibatsu recruited 
highly qualified personnel, particularly managers and skilled workers.  Morikawa 
(1980, pp.16-19) reports that the Meiji era zaibatsu had a grand total of 76 full-time 
professional directors and top managers - mostly at Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo.  
Of these about 29% were graduates of various Imperial universities or their 
predecessors, 21% were graduates of Keio Gijuku (the current Keio University) and 
7% were graduates of foreign universities.  About 60% of these people had been 
overseas.  In Meiji Japan, such people were scarce.  They had to be educated in newly 
created academic and other institutions, which were also few.  Indeed, the Mitsui 
founded Hitotsubashi University primarily to produce trained employees.  Morikawa  
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(1980) argues that this scarcity, and the concentration of talent in the zaibatsu groups 
were a decided advantage.  
 In postwar Japan, keiretsu core firms, promising lifetime employment, again 
became a preferred career path of bright graduates of Japan’s top universities.  
Employment at the keiretsu main banks was especially sought after.  This may have 
made considerable sense in the immediate postwar period, when many senior people 
in industry were tainted by wartime associations.  There was most likely a genuine 
scarcity of talent.  Competent managers could spread their expertise wider by working 
for keiretsu firms.  Banks, special repositories of managerial talent, could lend their 
expertise to keiretsu member firms in need to it.  Corporate groups could allocate 
talent to where it was needed, and so make efficient use of scarce governance 
expertise.  Kaplan and Minton (1992) show that bank executives were routinely 
transferred to the boards of financially troubled client firms later in the postwar period, 
consistent with the continued importance of such a story.    
However, the economies of scale associated with managerial talent are clearly 
bounded – otherwise central planning would have a better track record.  The collapse 
of the Suzuki zaibatsu just prior to the war was clearly due, in a large part at least, to 
the concentration of corporate control in the hands on one man – Naokichi Kaneko.  
Kaneko made few mistakes, but a single major misjudgment was enough to destroy 
the entire zaibatsu. 
  Moreover, it appears that the managers of keiretsu firms came to view each 
other as colleagues to be supported under all circumstances, rather than as potential 
blunderers to be monitored and, if necessary, reigned in.  This understandable, even 
laudable collegiality is evident in the result of Morck and Nakamura (2000) that the 
transfer of bankers to corporate boards does not appear to be associated with value  
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increasing restructuring.  Rather, the bankers seem there to supervise friendly bail 
outs.  The absence of negative consequences for poor corporate governance in this 
system is now widely believed responsible, in part at least, for Japan’s economic 
malaise.   
In short, a system designed to make the most of scarce talent ultimately 
became a mechanism for locking in entrenched, relatively untalented mangers.   
 
Financial Intermediation 
A third possibility, proposed by Asashima (1987), Okazaki (1999) and others 
regarding prewar zaibatsu and by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 
1991, 1993) in connection with postwar keiretsu, is that diversified corporate groups 
might serve a financing and coinsurance purpose.  This argument stresses that 
external funds are more costly than internal funds.  A free-standing undiversified 
company is subject to the vagaries of cost and demand in a single industry.  It might 
easily have excess cash flows in years when it has no good investment opportunities 
and insufficient cash flows to fund all the opportunities available in other years.     
  Membership in a corporate group containing a bank, or a firm that serves as a 
bank in some capacities, can remedy this.  The group bank can transfer excess funds 
from where they accumulate to where they are most needed.  Since the group bank 
has better information about the investment opportunities available to each firm, it can 
do this at much lower cost than could outside banks or financial markets.   
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) stress that such an information 
advantage may be especially critical in financially distressed firms, and that this 
financing role is most important in that it allows group firms to co-insure each other.  
In this view, keiretsu member firms overpay for bank loans so as to build up a reserve  
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in the group bank that can be used to remedy any financial problems a member firm 
encounters.   
Miyajima (2000) finds little evidence for this internal capital market 
hypothesis based on his estimation of investment functions for the zaibatsu firms in 
the 1930s.  He finds some evidence for the internal capital market hypothesis for 
postwar keiretsu firms, but only for a limited time period when the Japanese economy 
enjoyed very high growth.  Hoshi (1994) describes the Sumitomo group’s rescue of 
Mazda in the 1973 oil crisis via cheap loans, stock placements with Sumitomo Bank 
and other Sumitomo companies, and subsidized marketing, shipping, etc.  Nakatani 
(1984) finds that group firms’ performance is less variable than that of free-standing 
firms, Horiuchi et al. (1988) argues that such a coinsurance role should be evident in 
abnormally low interest payments during downturns and abnormally high interest 
payments during booms, which he does not find.  Hirota (1990) finds profit 
smoothing only for some firms and only in extreme downturns.  Hoshi et al. (1991) 
show that group firm investment is less sensitive to cash flow in regressions of 
investment on cash flow, average q, and controls.  Morck and Nakamura (2000) find 
evidence of large liquidity infusions in troubled keiretsu firms, but not in similarly 
troubled freestanding firms.  The problem with much of this evidence is that it is as 
consistent with bank bailouts of firms run by cronies as with an economically rational 
coinsurance system.   
The shortcomings of this use of groups over the long term are evident if we 
return to the prewar zaibatsu.  The Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo banks avoided 
financing their respective group companies.  Asajima (1984) describes how 
Sumitomo companies had deposits with the head office, which functioned as a 
merchant bank.  The Sumitomo Bank was not used to finance subsidiaries.   The  
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Sumitomo companies relied on retained earnings or transfers from the apex holding 
company for additional capital until 1924, after which there seems to have been very 
limited use of debt financing. These banks survived the depressions of the 1920s and 
1930s precisely because they had diversified loan portfolios that extended well 
beyond their  zaibatsu.  In contrast, the Taiwan Bank clearly served the Suzuki 
zaibatsu as a central financial clearing house.  This may have induced a sort of moral 
hazard problem, common to all group insurance schemes, in the management of 
Suzuki firms.  Certainly, when several Suzuki firms simultaneously encountered 
financial difficulty, the Taiwan Bank’s undiversified loan portfolio left  it deeply 
vulnerable.  Its attempt to correct these problems by distancing itself from the Suzuki 
zaibatsu proved impossible, and the bank failed, bringing down the House of Suzuki.  
Indeed, all the zaibatsu failures in the interwar period were of groups that used their 
banks in this fashion – that is, as ‘organ banks’.   
  The main banks at the centers of the great horizontal keiretsu of the postwar 
period were drafted into the role of “quasi-organ banks” – first by the SCAP and then 
by the industrial policy makers of postwar Japan.  Both regimes pressed the main 
banks to continue their wartime task of allocating capital to investments the 
government regarded as strategic, irrespective of their financial soundness.  Later, the 
keiretsu main banks took on the task of organizing financing for their group firms.  
Although syndication of loans meant that the  keiretsu banks were seldom as 
undiversified as the Taiwan Bank had been, their main bank roles meant that they 
were far more exposed to the financial fortunes of other keiretsu member firms than 
had been the case for the Mitsui, Sumitomo, or Mitsubishi banks through most of the 
prewar period.     
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The Ministry of Finance seems to have recognized that these duties exposed 
the banks to substantial risks.  Its response was twofold.  As noted above, Japan’s 
bank regulations locked in market power for banks.  Second, the Ministry of Finance 
provided a “blanket guarantee” to banks.  For example, the state bailed out not just the 
depositors, but also the bondholders and shareholders of troubled banks, such as the 
Heiwa Sogo Bank.    
Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000, 2001a) argue that this guarantee induced a 
grave moral hazard problem into bank governance.  The mere presence of a main 
bank with an insurance role doubtless encouraged moral hazard problems in keiretsu 
client firms.  Taken together, these problems certainly contributed to pervasive poor 
corporate governance.  As mutual insurance companies, which are thought to be 
subject to their own governance problems, bought u p the majority of shares in big 
Japanese banks in the 1990s,  Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000, 2001a) argue that the 
stage was set for a banking crisis.  They also note that this guarantee seems to have 
been credible in the early 1990s, but became less so later in that decade.  This is 
because they find that bank shares only began moving in response to news about 
solvency in the mid 1990s.  Nonetheless, Bremer and Pettway (2002) report that, 
although bank stock prices moved significantly in response to news about their 
financial soundness, this did not affect management policies.  This suggests that 
shareholders in banks began doubting the guarantee before bank managers did.   
Thus, Japanese financial history tells us that the use of a group bank as a 
financial clearing house and provider of financial insurance is unwise.  While such a 
system may provide short-run advantages, it is often not viable in the longer run.  The 
Suzuki zaibatsu, and other groups with organ banks, prospered in the short run, but 
failed when the economy as a whole took a downturn.  The horizontal keiretsu of the  
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post war period prospered during Japan’s long boom, but are clearly having serious 
problems riding out the current prolonged downturn.     
Moreover, many countries consider the sorts of intercorporate transactions 
whereby related companies transfer funds to each other at non-market prices to be a 
corporate governance problem.   While Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) 
clearly envision intercorporate financing arrangements at fair prices, once such 
arrangements become accepted, there are many reasons why corporate insiders might 
want to use artificial prices instead.  This leads to a governance problem that Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (2000) dub tunneling, and which corporate law 
calls self-dealing.   
In particular, the fear is that controlling shareholders use such cross-
subsidization to transfer assets and income from firms low in the pyramid to firms at 
or near the apex.  This is because the controlling shareholder’s real stake is largest in 
firms near the apex.  To see this, return to Figure 1.  The controlling family owns a bit 
more than half of Choten, the apex firm.  That means that a bit more than half of any 
dividend payout or capital gain from Choten accrues to the zaibatsu family.  Choten 
owns a bit more than half of each of the two Hitotsu level firms.  That means Choten 
a bit more than half of its dividends and capital gains accrue to Choten, and so a bit 
more than one quarter of its dividends and capital gains accrue to the family.  In 
general, if a firm is n levels below the apex firm, a fraction 
n 2
1
 of the firm’s 
dividends and capital gains accrue to the controlling shareholder of the pyramidal 
group.  The controlling family thus maximizes its own wealth by transferring as much 
income and wealth as it can from firms deep in the pyramid to firms at or near the 
apex.  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang  
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(2002), Faccio and Lang (2001) and many others p resent empirical evidence 
consistent with such transfers occurring in European and East Asian pyramids.   
We are forced to conclude that corporate groups, while they may serve a 
coinsurance and capital allocation function, do not glean long term benefits f rom 
these activities.  Although short term benefits may be evident, the moral hazards and 
other information and agency problems inherent in these undertakings ultimately 
undermine the financial health of the group.    
 
Private Benefits of Control 
This leads to a fourth possibility, the extraction of private benefits of control.  
Ziabatsu families may have been willing to pay more for controlling blocks of shares 
because they valued control per se more than other shareholders do.  This might be 
because members of these families have utility functions that assign greater weight to 
power.  If the families are not the most able managers, this could depress publicly 
traded shares while raising the family’s private valuation of its shares.  Or, private 
benefits of control might exist because these families are more proficient than other 
shareholders at using control over corporate assets to enrich themselves.   
  Likewise, the managers of postwar keiretsu firms organized those structures to 
stymie corporate takeover threats.  Had they not garnered utility from their control of 
great corporations, these actions would have made little sense.
76   
There is considerable evidence for the existence of large private benefits of 
corporate control.  Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985) show that stock 
prices rise significantly upon the deaths of the firms’ aged CEOs.  Morck, Shleifer, 
                                                 
76 It is theoretically possible that these managers were blocking takeovers out of beneficence.  For 
example, their goal might have been to protect myopic shareholders from selling at a large premium to 
the raider because even larger run-ups in their share prices were likely in the future.  However, the 
repeated empirical rejection of  shareholder myopia models undermines such arguments.    
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and Vishny (1988) show that high managerial ownership in certain US firms is 
associated with depressed public share prices.  Barclay and Holderness (1989) show 
that control blocks trade at higher prices than small transactions. Dyck and Zingales 
(2003) show that this effect is greater in more corrupt countries.  All of these studies 
are consistent with the existence of large private benefits of control.  The finding of 
Dyck and Zingales (2003) in particular suggests that the size of private benefits is 
related to corruption, and thus favors the view that these benefits involve the 
consumption of corporate wealth by the controlling shareholder.   
Certainly, the importance of maintaining control evident in the House Charters 
of the great  zaibatsu families and in the autobiographical writings of Yoshisuke 
Aikawa (1934), the founder of the Nissan zaibatsu.  Morck and Yeung (2003) argue 
that the extraction of private benefits of control is less dependent on talent than is 
genuine entrepreneurship, and that leaving one’s heirs opportunities to extract such 
benefits is therefore a preferred way of providing for them.   
A fixation on preserving control  rights can lead to inefficiently risk averse 
investment decisions.  Thus, Miyajima (2000) reports that firms belonging to the three 
major  zaibatsu exhibit greater risk-averse than firms belonging to newer zaibatsu.  
One explanation for this is more extensive private benefits of control for the 
principals of the established groups.    
In short, private benefits of control certainly figured large in the formation of 
zaibatsu and keiretsu.  This leaves open, however, the question of whether or not 
other considerations were also important.   
 
Financing Externalities  
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Much literature contemporaneous with the zaibatsu stresses their ability to ignore 
shareholders.  For example, a Meiji era report on the Kyushu Railway deplores that 
the company was “dominated from t he start by the vulgar view that it had to 
economize on building outlays.”   This refers to a conflict described by Ushiba (1899) 
as between “the stockholders desiring an increase in dividends even to the point of 
reducing the business, and the directors insisting on expanding the business even if it 
means cutting dividends”   Ericson (1989) describes how a large shareholder, the 
banker Imamura Seinosuke, tried not only to curtail the railway’s vast expansion 
plans, but to force it to downsize in response to the economic downturn of 1890.   
  Ericson (1989) applauds the railway’s “substantial progress (sic) in separating 
management from ownership” and the professionalism of its president, Sengoku 
Mitsugu, who owned little stock and could therefore go “on pursuing his positive 
policies, thrusting aside a second attempt by disgruntled stockholders to interfere with 
his program in 1902.”   But Ericson concedes that such “sophistication” was the 
exception.   
The Kyushu and Sanyo railroads were Mitsubishi companies, and Mitsubishi 
“differed from most railway owners in its primary concern for indirect benefits of 
railway investment.”   That is, the Mitsubishi railroads were not intended to maximize 
shareholder value, but to assist other Mitsubishi companies in transporting inputs and 
outputs.   
The foregoing is a somewhat convoluted way of saying that the  zaibatsu 
railways were forced to over-expand to reduce the shipping costs of other Mitsubishi 
companies, in a clear instance of ‘self-dealing” or “tunneling”.  However, this may 
not have been economically inefficient.  Since railways have a public good 
component, it is possible that shareholder value maximization would lead to a  
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suboptimal investment.  Tunneling by the  zaibatsu to overbuild might actually 
improve social welfare, though at the expense of the railways’ other shareholders. By 
1905, banks and insurance companies had emerged as the major shareholders in most 
railroads, and such self-sacrifice by railroad shareholders was at an end.  The railroads 
nationalized in 1906 and 1907.   
Governments elsewhere certainly took advantage of large corporate groups as 
preexisting command and control devices for implementing industrial policies.  For 
example, Korea, Malaysia and Sweden appear to have encouraged pyramidal groups 
so that government officials could influence the corporate sector by dealing directly 
with a few individuals – the patriarchs in charge of the pyramids.  The governments in 
question seem to have believed, perhaps correctly, that these small group interactions 
allowed a highly effective transmission of government policies and a better 
coordination of private and public sector initiatives.   
Certainly, the zaibatsu were more agile and willing than free standing firms to 
change direction rapidly in order  to accommodate changing government policy 
objectives.  By rapidly expanding one firm with capital from others, the zaibatsu 
could quickly change direction and focus.  Their large established capital bases also 
let them enter new industries quickly.  Postwar keiretsu were also favored as vehicles 
through which industrial policy might be implemented.   
This agility was clearly beneficial in terms of endearing the  zaibatsu and 
keiretsu to certain government officials.  However, it did not always enrich the groups 
involved.  Certainly, the zaibatsu families lost out heavily during the war despite their 
groups’ agility in expanding munitions production.  More generally, deviating from 
value maximizing behavior has costs that should accrue to the disadvantage of the  
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group over time.  This may explain the weakness of the keiretsu firms in present day 
Japan.     
 
Groups and Political Rent Seeking 
However, another possibility is that the close relationships corporate groups 
develop with government generate financial returns that compensate for profits lost 
while pursuing government objectives.  Morck, Yeung, and Stangeland (2000), in 
discussing pyramidal groups throughout the world, argue that government officials 
and great mercantile family patriarchs who come to know and trust each other are 
likely to engage in mutual back-scratching, favors-trading, and other forms of 
corruption that, while beneficial for the family group of firms, can greatly damage the 
economy.   Fisman (199x), Johnson and Mitton (2001), Morck, Yeung and Stangeland 
(2000), Rajan and Zingales (2001) and others present empirical evidence consistent 
with this more skeptical view.   
There is considerable evidence that business-government relations in both 
prewar and postwar Japan were largely organized around rent seeking.  .  Morikawa 
(1992, pp.3-4) argues that political entrepreneurship, the use of ties to powerful 
political figures to obtain government favors, reaped huge returns in the provision of 
goods and services to the state and to state-owned enterprises in the Meiji period.    
The great zaibatsu of prewar Japan all obtained a leg up on their competitors 
due to government favors.  The Sumitomo obtained their cash cow copper mines 
because of their close association with the Tokugawa regime.  The  Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi  zaibatsu obtained cash cow mining operations in barely competitive 
privatizations by the Meiji government.  All three prospered in prewar Japan in part 
because of their ability to give the government what it wanted when it wanted it.  If  
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the government decided Japan needed to export, the zaibatsu could move into export 
oriented businesses.  If the government decided Japan needed technology, the 
zaibatsu could rev up their machinery production.  In short, the zaibatsu seem to have 
been able to react to the changing whims of government policy makers with greater 
nimbleness and forcefulness than other firms could manage.   
In postwar Japan, the keiretsu firms and their main banks also appear to have 
been generously subsidized for their enthusiasm about industrial policy programs.  
Indeed, Beason and Weinstein (1995) show that the greater part of Japan’s postwar 
industrial subsidies went to mining operations, most of which were members of the 
large horizontal keiretsu.  In contrast, independent companies like Honda were denied 
subsidies for deliberately contravening industrial policy plans by, for example, 
producing automobiles when told not to.    
 The importance of rent-seeking in post-war Japan is evident in the status 
accruing to employment in government.   This status existed largely because of the 
attractions of a career path involving amakudari:  literally, “descent from heaven”.  
Amakudari involves an older, high-ranking government official leaving his post to 
become a senior manager in industry, and was a common path to the board room in 
postwar Japan.   This practice may have made sense in the immediate postwar period, 
when there was perhaps a serious shortage of talent due to the purging of senior 
executives who had cooperated with the military government.   
However, amakudari subsequently devolved into a system of regulator capture, 
as described by Stigler (1971).  This was largely because of the genkyoku principle, 
whereby specific ministries claimed exclusive regulatory power over  specific 
industries.  Since civil servants in these ministries were prime candidates for 
amakudari, the ministries rapidly became vocal advocate within government for the  
  107 
 
interests of their industries.  For example, in the race for industrial promotion of 
biotechnology, the Ministry of Health wanted to participate in policymaking explicitly 
on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry, its traditional amakudari partners.   Since 
the great keiretsu firms both included the most attractive amakudari landing spots and 
were the most enthusiastic about  amakudari, these groups may have enjoyed an 
advantage, in the short term at least, due to their better connections with government.   
This regulatory capture is now thought to have contributed to Japan’s current 
economic and governance problems.
77  Bureaucrats uncritically advanced industry 
agendas, hopeful of  amakudari opportunities.  Corporate executives, former 
bureaucrats, realized that their talents were in influencing government, rather than 
overseeing new research and development programs.  The result was an unhealthy 
regulatory morass that came to surround many established industries in Japan, and 
that is now the subject of much criticism.   
 
9.   Conclusions 
During Japan’s modern history, beginning in 1868, its corporate sector was first 
organized into great family pyramids, or  zaibatsu, then subjected to Soviet-style 
central planning, then reorganized into widely held firms, and finally restructured into 
keiretsu corporate groups.  These organizational forms appear to have been responses 
to changing institutional constraints.  By studying the historical origins of these 
groups and how the prospered or floundered, we can begin to understand which 
institutional constraints mattered the most and how changing institutional constraints 
both induced and affected different organizational structures.    
                                                 
77 See Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) for a discussion of the role of  amakudari in Japan’s current 
economic downturn.    
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  Although the zaibatsu are often viewed by Japanese historians as uniquely 
Japanese constructs, they are not substantially different from family controlled 
pyramidal groups that the other papers in this volume show dominating the corporate 
sectors of most other countries at the time.  The zaibatsu were probably sensible 
structures for sidestepping Japan’s early, and probably poorly functioning markets.  
By doing business mainly with each other, zaibatsu firms could avoid being cheated 
or otherwise harmed in inefficient and opaque markets for goods, labor, and capital.  
The postwar keiretsu, which actually are a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, may have 
been, in part at least, a similar response to the chaotic early postwar years.    
  Shortages of managerial talent in early Meiji Japan and in postwar Japan 
following MacArthur’s purges might also have lent advantages to groups.  By 
allowing good managers to spread themselves across m ore activities, groups may 
have been an economically sound response to a genuine scarcity.  However, by 
entrenching insiders, zaibatsu families and keiretsu managers, these groups ultimately 
achieved just the opposite.  They became barriers to the placing of corporate control 
rights in the hands of the most able.   
  Both  zaibatsu and  keiretsu were also clearly devices for entrenching the 
control rights of insiders.  Zaibatsu were mechanisms whereby great mercantile 
families or entrepreneurial individuals could direct vast amounts of public investor 
capital yet retain full control of all the ventures so funded.  Keiretsu were undeniably 
formed to stop hostile takeovers raids and secure tenure for the professional managers 
running postwar Japan’s great companies.  That insiders sought such entrenchment 
suggests strongly that they were receiving private benefits of control.   
  Both  zaibatsu and  keiretsu were also clearly more agile and forceful in 
redirecting their energies to support state industrial objectives than were free standing  
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firms.  By participating enthusiastically in government industrial policies, no matter 
how wrong-headed, these groups nurtured relations that generated both subsidies and 
political influence.  Such influence was often instrumental  in securing lasting 
advantages over the competition, as when the early  zaibatsu families obtained tax 
farming concessions, mines, and government contracts.  In the postwar period, 
keiretsu banks and firms also benefited disproportionately from regulatory favoritism 
and overt subsidies.   
  Thus, weak institutions, scarce talent, private benefits of control, and the 
importance of political entrepreneurship all arguably led to the formation and survival 
of certain corporate group structures.  However, we are forced to conclude that other 
common justifications for corporate groups are at best of second order importance.   
One such argument is the view that corporate groups can obtain economies of 
scope and scale without incurring agency problems.  We argue that this view is highly 
implausible except perhaps for vertical keiretsu – though empirical evidence of this is 
lacking.   
Another such argument is that groups can orchestrate intercorporate transfers 
to outperform financial markets in the task of capital allocation.  We argue that, while 
active capital allocation by a group bank can appear beneficial in the shorter term, the 
moral hazards and other distortions it induces undermine the group’s longer term 
financial health.  Thus, the group banks of the successful  zaibatsu  - Mitsui , 
Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi – shunned to role of providing an internal capital market.  
The organ banks of other zaibatsu embraced this role and all failed.  The keiretsu 
main banks of postwar Japan functioned somewhat like organ banks, and are also 
ending badly.   
  Finally, corporate groups themselves clearly affected Japanese institutions.    
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By lobbying for the suppression of the corporate bond market in postwar 
Japan, main banks seriously weakened the financial system overall.  Thus b ank-
centered groups, perhaps a response to the weakness of the immediate postwar 
financial system, became the cause of prolonged financial weakness.   
Although zaibatsu and keiretsu might initially have been devices for extracting 
economies of scale from s carce talented managers, by entrenching insiders, they 
ultimately kept talented outsiders out of boardrooms.  This certainly affected firm-
level performance.  But it may have retarded macroeconomic growth as well.  
Morikawa (1980, 1992) argues that entrenched zaibatsu families’ risk-aversion and 
restrictions on external financing to preserve family control retarded prewar Japan’s 
growth.  He argues that few projects for Japan’s industrialization were initiated by 
zaibatsu.  Morck et al. (2000) argue that oversight by entrenched bankers may have 
had a similar effect on keiretsu firms.    
By engaging in extensive political rent seeking, certain  zaibatsu obtained a 
competitive advantage over more classical entrepreneurs who merely innovated and 
took risks.  The collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu because of its lack of connections is 
one example.  Murphy et al. (1993) and many others present evidence that pervasive 
rent-seeking impedes growth.  This is because talented individuals are diverted away 
from genuine entrepreneurship towards more lucrative careers in rent-seeking.  It is 
also because both rent seeking and innovation have increasing returns to scale for 
individuals and firms.  However, rent seeking is a zero or negative sum game, while 
innovation is a positive sum game.  Thus a diversion of talent into ever more lucrative 
rent seeking diverts ever greater resources into zero or negative sum games, and thus 
slows growth.    
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The cooperation of  zaibatsu and  keiretsu with industrial policies also led 
captive regulator problems.  Entire ministries were apparently captured by industrial 
groups through  genkyoku and  amakudari.  This undermined the state’s ability to 
regulate prudently the economy and the financial system.  
Overall, we infer that corporate groups became economically dominant in 
response to particular institutional constraints.  However, they then invested in 
modifying those constraints to lock in that dominance.  These modifications were 
almost surely not social welfare enhancing.  This suggests a dubious value of 
corporate groups in advanced economies.    
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Table 1. Ten Zaibatsu Combines Designated by HCLC for Dissolution  
 
Zaibatsu 
Number of subsidiaries 
in 1937 
Number of subsidiaries 
in 1946  
Paid-in capital as % of 
Japan’s 1946 total
a 
       
Mitsui  101   294   9.4 
Mitsubishi   73    241   8.3 
Sumitomo   34    166   5.2 
Yasuda   44      60   1.6 
The big four total  252    761  24.5 
       
Nissan   77    179    5.3 
Asano   50      59    1.8 
Furukawa   19      53    1.5 
Okura   51      58    1.0 
Nakajima   -      68    0.6 
Nomura   -      19    0.5 
The other six total  197    439  10.7 
       
Top ten zaibatsu total  449  1200  35.2 
 
Source: HCLC  volumes as cited in Hadley (1970), Takahashi and Aoyama (1938,  pp. 151-152). 
a Japanese government estimates for Japan’s paid-in capital in 1946 are: 32 billion yen (Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry), 43 billion yen (Ministry of Finance) and 48 billion yen (Bank of Japan).  The 
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Table 2.  Ownership shares of the Mitsui families 
 









1867 – 1873 






Mitsui, Takatoshi’s sons         
Oldest son  29(41.5%)  62(28.2%)  62(28.2%)  230(23.0%) 
Second oldest son (Takahira)  13(18.6)  30(13.6)  30(13.6)  115(11.5) 
Third oldest son  9(12.9)  27(12.3)  27(12.3)  115(11.5) 
Fourth oldest son  7.5(10.7)  25(11.4)  25(11.4)  115(11.5) 
Sixth oldest son  4.5(6.4)  22.5(10.2)  ---  --- 
Ninth oldest son  1.5(2.1)  22.5(10.2)  22.5(10.2)  115(11.5) 
Tenth oldest son (merged with 
sixth) 
 
1.2(2.1)  ---  22.5(10.2)  115(11.5) 
Other relatives and wife         
1 Takatoshi’s wife  100kanme of 
silver 
---  ---  --- 
2  2(2.9)  8(3.6)  8(3.6)  39(3.9) 
3  1.5(2.1)  ---  ---  --- 
4  0.8(1.1)  6(2.7)  6(2.7)  39(3.9) 
5  ---  7(3.2)  7(3.2)  39(3.9) 
6  ---  ---  2.5(1.2)  39(3.9) 
7 
 
---  ---  3(1.4)  39(3.9) 
Remainder  ---  10(4.5)  4.5(2.0)  --- 
         
Total  70(100%)  220(100%)  220(100%)  1,000(100%) 
a The founder of the Mitsui family enterprise, Hachirobei-Takatoshi Mitsui (1622-1694), began co-
ownership oftheir family business. His 1694 will states that total family business annual profits be 
divided into 70 units for an annual distribution among his wife and sons.                   
 
b Takahira, the second generation head of the Mitsu family business, revised the profit distribution 
method in his 1722 will.  The will states that total annual profits be divided into 220 units for an annual 
distribution among the family owners of the business.  In this revision the ownerships shares of the first 
and second sons’ families were decreased while the ownership shares of other family members and 
relatives were increased.  These revised ownership shares remained unchanged for the following 150 
years.   
c After the revision of the Mitsui family constitution was worked out during the first 20 years of the 
Meiji period, the Mitsui family partnership was created and its ownership shares remained unchanged 
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Table 3. Amounts of shares held (paid-in book value, 1000  yen) 
 
Company  Date 
Shares held  
(paid-in book value, ¥1000) 
Mitsui Bussan  April 1910  1,699 
Mitsui Bank  December 1909  4,893 
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Mitsui Gomei  
percent stake 
Mitsui family holding company 
Mitsui Gomei 
 
300  300  n/a 
Mitsui’s designated subsidiaries 
Mitsui Bank  100  60  100 
Mitsui Bussan  100  100  100 
Mitsui Mining  100  62.5  100 
Toshin Warehousing  15  12.5  100 
Mitsui Trust  30  7.5  100 
Mitsui Life Insurance  2  0.5  100 
 
Subsidiaries of Mitsui’s designated subsidiaries 
Taiheiyo Colliery  11  5.5   
Kamaishi Mining  20  20   
Claude-Process Nitrogen 
Industries  10  10   
Toyo Cotton Trading  25  15   
Toyo Rayon  10  10   
 
Mitsui’s ordinary subsidiaries 
Ojo Paper  65.91  48.68  24 
Shibaura Engineering Works  20  20  56.4 
Hokkaido Colliary & Steamship  70  43.68  19.7
a 
Nippon Steel Works  30  30  12.5 
Dai Nippon Celluloid  10  10  27.9 
Kanegahuchi Cotton Spinning  60  28.6  5.3 
Onoda Cement  31  21.82  9.6 
Denki Kagaku Kogyo  18  17.5  6.9 
Mitsukoshi Department Store  15  15  0 
Source: Shogyo Koshinsho (1930), Morikawa (1992) 
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Table 5.  Industrial Diversification of the Ten Major Zaibatsu in 1945, in 
Millions of Yen.    
 
  Industry 




Industry  Other 
Zaibatsu 
Total 
Zaibatsu     
(% of economy) 
Mitsui  169  2,214  274  404  3,061  9.4 
Mitsubishi  160  1,866  73  605  2,704  8.3 
Sumitomo  65  1,469  29  102  1,667  5.2 
Yasuda  209  119  117  64  510  1.6 
Nissan(Aikawa)  5  1,558  103  38  1,703  5.3 
Asano  0  419  89  76  594  1.8 
Furukawa  4  479  3  4  490  1.5 
Okura  6  218  34  56  314  1.0 
Nakajima  0  188  24  0.768  213  0.6 
Nomura  26  50  27  62  165  0.5 




1,215  17,513  4,600  9,108  32,437  100.0 
Top ten zaibatsu 




49  17  16  35   
 Source: Holding Company Liquidation Committee (HCLC), Japanese zaibatsu and its dissolution, as cited in Yasuoka (1976, pp. 
34-35).   
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Table 6. Kuhara Mining Company: the composition of shareholders, 1918-1927  
 
  June 1918  June 1920  May 1927 
Total number of outstanding shares   1,500,000  1,500,000  1,500,000 
Total number of shareholders  9,761  13,842  14,858 
Average number of shares held per shareholder  153.7  108.0  100.9 
 
Shareholders with 5000 or more shares 
Total number of shareholders   31  20  18 
Share ownership (%)  67.3  51.4  44.3 
Average number of shares held per shareholder  32,566.5  38,550.0  36,916.7 
 
Shareholders with fewer than 500 shares 
Total number of shareholders   9,544  13,649  14,739 
Share ownership (%)  28.5  35.8  39.6 
Average number of shares held per shareholder  44.7  40.0  40.3 
 
Kuhara family and relatives  45.6%  45.1%  37.3% 









Rankings of the Top Zaibatsu as of Midyear 1937 by Number of Firms and Paid-
in Capital 
 
Zaibatsu  Number of Group 
Firms 
Total Paid-in Capital 
1. Mitsui  101  ¥1,177,200,000   
2. Mitsubishi   73  ¥848,204,000   
3. Nissan   77  ¥473,632,000   
4. Sumitomo   34  ¥383,800,000   
5. Yasuda   44  ¥263,866,000   
6. Asano   50  ¥236,261,000   
7. Nichitsu   26  ¥197,100,000   
8. Mori   20  ¥141,996,000   
9. Okura   51  ¥133,845,000   
10.Furukawa   19  ¥101,994,000   
Source: Yasuoka (1976)      





Suzuki Trading Company debt to the Bank of Taiwan (yen) 
 
Year  New Debt  Total Debt 
1920  ---  80,811,300 
1921  42,907,587  123,718,887 
1922  55,317,426  179,036,313 
1923  47,869,445  226,905,758 
1924  49,145,662  276,051,420 
1925  37,223,293  313,274,713 
1926  43,581,754  356,856,470 
1927  22,002,099  378,858,569 
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Table 9. Six Largest Zaibatsu Banks’ Deposits and Loans, 1931-1937 
 
  Deposits (Loans) in million yen 




710 (413)  647 (313)  659 (371)  684 (402)  610 (438)  --- 
June 1932  620 (441)  616 (344)  648 (394)  679 (423)  607 (460)  --- 
Dec. 1932 
 
687 (429)  640 (317)  703 (399)  735 (447)  664 (479)  --- 
June 1933  696 (386)  705 (324)  769 (406)  815 (472)  730 (507)  --- 
Dec. 1933 
 
715 (409)  661 (274)  787 (418)  798 (461)  740 (511)  1025 (519) 
June 1934  759 (366)  696 (259)  816 (409)  827 (426)  800 (519)  1063 (489) 
Dec. 1934 
 
748 (383)  722 (265)  852 (422)  872 (466)  807 (548)  1077 (496) 
June 1935  759 (380)  752 (265)  868 (432)  886 (471)  818 (571)  1080 (494) 
Dec. 1935 
 
796 (451)  730 (294)  913 (448)  952 (522)  832 (578)  1114 (494) 
June 1936  824 (437)  805 (341)  940 (450)  970 (543)  891 (616)  1151 (526) 
Dec. 1936 
 
856 (518)  810 (370)  972 (545)  1017 (618)  928 (679)  1197 (532) 
June 1937 
 
904 (531)  903 (441)  1054 (657)  1093 (691)  1023 (744)  1263 (577) 
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Table 10. Japanese Production Output by Industry, 1929 and 1942 (in 1,000 yen) 
 
  1929  1942 
Rank  Industry  Output  Industry  Output 
1  raw silk  795,599  iron and steel  2,626,512 
2  cotton yarn  678,466  navy and army arsenals  2,294,100 
3  electric power  658,316  aircraft  1,930,400 
4  broad cotton fabrics  526,096  guns, bullets and weapons  1,915,242 
5  national railways  517,795  national railways  1,441,921 
6  Japanese sake  302,120  electric power  1,375,943 
7  coal mining  245,762  coal mining  1,077,769 
8  private railways  232,254  shipbuilding  858,377 
9  military ordinance  208,537  industrial chemicals  785,169 
10  state-run steel mills  189,551  special steel  753,170 
11  printing  186,304  eletrical machinery  633,292 
12  wool fabrics  176,896  medicine  630,800 
13  steel products  173,833  private railways  560,337 
14  sugar  158,125  lumber  551,600 
15  flour milling  134,895  pig iron  502,631 
16  chemical fertilizers  132,711  raw silk  463,098 
17  broad silk fabrics  129,516  metal machine tools  449,442 
18  lumber  112,170  coke  421,210 
19  non-ferrous metal mining  108,204  cotton yarn  327,520 
20  copper  108,166  tools  323,895 




  133 
 
Table 11.  Group Affiliations of the Fifty Most Firms with Highest Net Profits 
 
  1929  1943  1955  1973  1984 
           
State controlled firms
a       9  20  2  2  3 
   Firms  5  14       
   Banks  4  6       
           
Foreign controlled firms  0  0  0  1  1 
           
Zaibatsu total    
  16  25  23  23  19 
    “Old” zaibatsu total  16  17  -  -  - 
         Mitsui  7  7  3  4  3 
         Mitsubishi  5  6  6  7  6 
         Sumitomo  2  1  2  3  2 
         Yasuda  1  1  -  -  - 
         Furukawa  -  1  -  -  - 
         Asano  1  1  -  -  - 
   “New” zaibatsu total  -  8  -  -  - 
         Nissan  -  5  -  -  - 
         Nichitsu  -  2  -  -  - 
         Nisso  -  1  -  -  - 
           
Keiretsu total
d  -  -  23  23  19 
    “Old” keiertsu total  -  -  11  14  11 
    “New” keiertsu total  -  -  12  9  8 
         Fuji  -  -  4  5  3 
         Sanwa  -  -  5  2  3 
         Daiichi-Kangyo   -  -  3  2  2 
           
Independent 
 
29  14  25  24  27 
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p.17) 
a.  In 1943 three Manchurian firms are double-counted to be affiliated with both the government and 
the Nissan Zaibatsu. 
b.   Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Furukawa, and Asano.   
c.   Nissan, Nichitsu, and Nisso.   
d.  For the post WWII years firms with two keiretsu affiliations, such as Hitachi, Ltd. and Nippon 
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shares held by family 
and headquarters (%) 
Stockholding ratio: 
shares held by all 
members of the same 
Zaibatsu (%) 
Mitsui  6  90.2  90.6 
Mitsubishi  10  69.4  77.6 
Sumitomo  13  79.1  80.5 
Yasuda  12  31.7  48.1 
Furukawa  4  72.8  89.4 
Asano  6  50.8  --- 
Okura  20  84.7  92.7 
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Table 13.  Shareholding by Large Block Holders 
 
  1919  1936 
     
Number of sample firms  379  477 
 
Holdings by large shareholders 
   
      No.of shareholders (%)  0.59  0.36 
      No. of outstanding shares (%)  21.0  37.4 
              Individuals(%)  15.5  5.9 
              Banks(%)  0.8  2.1 
              Ins./securities/trust firms(%)
a  0.5  4.8 




Average number of shareholders/firm 
 
2,040  3,589 
Average number of shares held/shareholder      
               12 largest shareholders   4,644  17,434 
               other 
 
103  95 
Source: Shimura (1969), Takeda (***) 
a insurance firms, securities firms, trust banks/firms  
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Table 14.   Changes in Zaibatsu Structure, 1929 to 1943 
      
Panel A.  First tier subsidiaries ownership structure 
  Number of shareholders of 
Combined stake of  
other zaibatsu companies (%) 
Subsidiary  1929  1943  1929  1943 
 
Mitsui Bussan  31  15,155  100  75.8 
Mitsui Mining  26  6912  100  84.8 
         
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding  23  6912  100  40.9 
Mitsubishi Shoji  20  5940  100  47.2 
         
Sumitomo Steel  14  7557  100  41.4 
         
 
 
Panel B. First tier subsidiaries that experienced mergers 
  Number of shareholders of 
Combined stake of  
other zaibatsu companies (%) 
Subsidiary  1929  1943  1929  1943 
 
Oji Paper CO.  6000  23516  25.2  3.5 
Toshiba Electric 
 
211  5885  58.4  15.1 
 
 
Panel C.  Average Percentage Ownership of Group Companies by Other Zaibatsu Companies 
 
  1929  1943 
 
Mitsui  51  31.7 
Mitsubishi  52.5  35.2 
Sumitomo  52.9  32.8 
Yasuda  46.4  58.3 
Furukawa  65.2  44.5 
Asano 
  19.8  21.5 
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Table 15. Composition of 10 Largest Stockholders of Independent Enterprises: 1929 and 1943 
 












companies  individuals 
Toyo 
Spinning  3.1%  0.8  1.1  8.0 
Osaka Godo 





8.2%  2.8  1.1  3.5 
Dai Nippon 
Spinning  5.5  ---  1.1  7.0 
Dai Nippon 
Spinning  7.6  1.8  1.0  3.1 
Sanjushi 
Bank 
4.6  0.9  2.4  6.9 
Yamaguchi 
Bank  36.2  1.0  33.3  10.7 
Kamoike 
Bank  85.6  ---  82.9  13.3 
Sanwa Bank 
(merged) 





6.9  2.8  2.9  6.0 
Dai Nippon 
Sugar Mfg. 
22.1  17.4  4.7  1.6 
Dai Nippon 
Breweries  10.8  2.1  8.7  3.0 
dai Nippon 
Breweries  13.8  10.8  1.2  --- 
Nippon Oil  9.1  1.9  7.2  7.4  Nippon Oil  9.4  2.9  5.6  9.5 
Kobe Steel 
Works  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Kobe Steel 
Works  38.7  27.2  ---  --- 
Kawasaki 
Shipbuilding  17.0  ---  15.9  15.2 
Kawasaki 


















25.5  13.8  2.9  2.2 
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p.38) 
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Table 16. Ownership Structures of Top Four Zaibatsu in 1945 
 
      Percent Stakes of Zaibatsu Parties 
 




firms  Total 
Mitsui     1  10,000  63.6  ---  0.9  64.5 
   First tier firms  10  17,979  9.5  53.9  11.9  75.3 
   Second tier firms  13   9,038  0.0  35.9  17.2  53.1 
             
Mitsubishi     1    4,800  47.8  ---  10.8  58.6 
   First tier firms  11  41,234  1.4  28.9  15.3  47.5 
   Second tier firms  16    8,053  0.2  18.2  40.3  58.7 
             
Sumitomo     1      600  83.3  ---  16.7  100.0 
   First tier firms  17  34,312  8.4  19.5  16.6  44.5 
   Second tier firms  6    5,325  0.5  12.7  30.7  43.9 
             
Yasuda     1       300  100.0  ---  ---  100 
   First tier firms  20    9,469  3.5  24.3  17.8  45.6 
   Second tier firms  12    3,860  0.1  16.9  15.3  32.3 
             





  140 
 
Table 17. New Share Issues, 1948-1953 




Number of new shares issued  50,094  78,718  39,192  83,644  123,336  91,569 
B  Percent of (A) issued to finance 
restructuring  
30.5  17.0  5.6  0.3  ---  --- 
C  No. of shares released by HCLC for 
zaibatsu dissolution purposes 
40,317  39,711  854  996  ---  --- 
D  Average price per share  ---  128.85  74.00  93.8  124.06  156.05 
E  Stock return (%)  4.02  4.65  6.61  7.99  8.02  7.96 
F 
 
Excess return above interest rate  -4.80  -4.96  -2.47  -1.22  -1.03  -0.85 
Notes: Figures in (A), (C) and (D) are for 1,000 shares. 
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Table 18. Tokyo Stock Exchange Price Index 
 
  1949  1950  1951  1952 
 
Low  98.50 (December)  85.25 (July)  102.20 (January)  167.80 (January) 
   
High 
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Table 19.  Price-capital stock and price-equity ratios for Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 
Sumitomo zaibatsu firms, 1949 - 1953 
 
    1949  1950  1951  1952  1953 
 
Mitsubishi  W/K  1.61  0.46  0.39  0.72  1.00 
  W/E 
 
2.43  0.68  0.45  0.75  0.97 
Sumitomo  W/K  1.96  0.34  0.35  0.78  0.86 
  W/E 
 
3.22  0.34  0.31  0.68  0.77 
Mitsui  W/K  0.91  0.27  0.27  0.45  0.57 
  W/E 
 
1.71  0.34  0.44  0.75  0.80 
Notes: W=average share price; K=fixed capital stock (book value); E=stockholders’ equity set equal to 
[total assets (book value)  - total debt (book value)].  The numbers of firms included for Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo and Mitsui groups are 15, 8 and 12, respectively. 
Source: Miyajima (1994). 
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Figure 10 
How Cross Holdings Affect the Value of Shares Upon Dissolution 
 
Panel A.  Prior to Dissolution
Apex firm
Assets:   ¥100 million Real assets
¥100 million Shares of B
¥200 million Total
Income: ¥10 million Operating Income
¥10 million Dividends from B
¥20 million Total
Shares:   ¥100 Price per share
¥10 Dividend per share
1 million Zaibatsu family
1 million Subsidiary B
2 million Total
Assets:   ¥100 million Real assets
¥100 million Shares of A
¥200 million Total
Income: ¥10 million Operating Income
¥10 million Dividends from A
¥20 million Total
Shares: ¥100 Price per share
¥10 Dividend per share
1 million Public shareholders
1 million Parent firm A
2 million Total
Subsidiary also owns shares in apex firm
Panel B,  After Dissolution
Assets:   ¥100 million Real assets Assets:   ¥100 million Real assets
¥100 million Total ¥100 million Total
Income: ¥10 million Operating Income Income: ¥10 million Operating Income
¥10 million Total ¥10 million Total
Shares:   ¥50 Price per share Shares:   ¥50 Price per share
¥5 Dividend per share ¥5 Dividend per share
2 million Public shareholders 2 million Public shareholders




Firm B Firm A
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